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THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT'S FALL FROM GRACE
IN THE SUPREME COURT
J.B. Ruhl*
Thirty-five years ago, the EndangeredSpecies Act ("ESA") had as auspicious a
debut in the U.S. Supreme Court as any statute could hope for. In Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Hill, a majority of the Court proclaimed that the ESA was intended "to
halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost" and backed
up those and other bold words by preventing a nearly completed federal dam from
impounding its reservoir because doing so would eliminate the only known (at the
time) habitat of a small fish, the now infamous snail darter. To this day, Hill remains actively discussed in judicial opinions, on environmental lawyers' short list of
important cases, a mainstay of law school casebooks, and a lively focus of legal
scholarship. As it turns out, however, Hill has become the extreme outlier in the
Court's ESA jurisprudence. In a series of four decisions spaced out from 1992 to
2007, two focusing on standing doctrine and two on statutory substance, the Court
has silently but unmistakably eviscerated Hill, thereby knocking the ESA off its
pedestal.
This Article is the first to examine the ESA's remarkablefallfrom grace in the
Court. It does so not only as a measure of where the ESA has traveled in the Court,
but also more broadly to examine where environmental values and environmental
law fit in the Court'sjurisprudence and what that suggestsfor the design of environmental law. Part I provides brief overviews of the ESA, the cases, and the Justices'
voting patterns to situate the Court'sfour post-Hill decisions in theirjurisprudential
contexts. The body of the Article then moves through three lessons that Hill's successors have to offer. Part II uses the ESA's slow demise as a window into the
Court's environmental values perspective, using what has happened to the ESA to
illuminate and evaluate various legal scholars' theories of how the Court views the
natural environment as a jurisprudentialcontext. Part III argues that the driving
causal agent behind the ESA's decline has been the evolution of the statute's implementationfrom a novelty in environmental law to a robust regulatoryprogram. The
evidence from the ESA's fall from grace, therefore, is that while the Court has at
times seemed apathetic to, confused about, or hostile to the environment, the better
explanation for what has happened to the ESA is that the Court is skeptical about
environmental law. PartIV thus closes by extracting what can be learnedfrom the
history of the ESA in the Court about the design of environmental laws, particularly
those aimed at ecosystem protection and biodiversity conservation.
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INTRODUCTION

Thirty-five years ago, the Endangered Species Act ("ESA")' had as
auspicious a debut in the U.S. Supreme Court as any statute could hope for.
In Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,2 a majority of the Court proclaimed
that the ESA was "the most comprehensive legislation for the preservation
of endangered species ever enacted by any nation" 3 and was intended "to
halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost."'
The majority backed up those and other bold words' with equally bold action
by finding that section 7 of the ESA, which directs federal agencies not to
"jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened
species,"6 prohibited a nearly completed federal dam from impounding its
reservoir because doing so would eliminate the only known (at the time)
' Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006). This Article is not
intended to provide a comprehensive overview of the ESA. For thorough treatment of the
ESA, see generally MICHAEL J. BEAN & MELANIE J. ROWLAND, THE EvoLuTION OF NATIONAL
WILDLIFE LAW 193-276 (3d ed. 1997); ENDANGERED SPECIES AcT: LAW, POLICY, AND PER-

SPECTIVES (Donald C. Baur & Win. Robert Irvin eds., 2d ed. 2010) [hereinafter LAW, POLICY,
AND PERSPECTIVES]; ERIC T. FREYFOGLE & DALE D. GOBLE, WILDLIFE LAW: A PRIMER
233-77 (2009); LAWRENCE R. LIEBESMAN & RAFE PETERSEN, ENDANGERED SPECIES
DESKBOOK (2d ed. 2010); STANFORD ENVTL. LAW Soc'Y, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
(2001); TONY A. SULLINS, ESA: ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (2001); THE ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT AT THIRTY: RENEWING THE CONSERVATION PROMISE (Dale D. Goble et al. eds., 2006)
[hereinafter THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT THIRTY].
2 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
3

Id. at 180.

4 Id. at 184.

For example, Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the majority also found that "the language, history, and structure of the [ESA] indicate[ ] beyond doubt that Congress intended
endangered species to be afforded the highest of priorities." Id. at 174.
6 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). At the time of the Hill litigation, this so-called "jeopardy prohibition" appeared in section 7 of the ESA, which was amended in 1979 to disaggregate section
7 into several subdivisions associated with different federal agency duties, with the jeopardy
prohibition appearing in section 7(a)(2). Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1979, Pub.

L. No. 96-159, § 4(1)(C), 93 Stat. 1225, 1226 (1979); see BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 1, at
240 n.232; see also STANFORD ENvTL. LAW SOC'Y, supra note 1, at 22-24 (discussing the 1978
amendments to the ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e), which created the "God Squad" to allow limited exemptions for federal projects).
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habitat of a small fish, the now infamous snail darter.7 Not all observers
were as impressed with the statute or the fish at the time - the decision was
ridiculed by many8 and brought sweeping condemnations in Congress9 and the ESA has since been no stranger to controversy. 0 But to this day,
Hill remains "the best known case in environmental law"" - it is on environmental lawyers' short list of important cases," a mainstay of environmental law casebooks," actively discussed in judicial opinions,14 and a lively
focus of legal scholarship." Hill remains important.16
Having found that the operative language of section 7 "admits of no exception," 437
U.S. at 173, the Court rejected the government's argument that a court's equitable powers
justified denial of the plaintiffs' requested injunction, see id. at 193-95. After quoting Sir
Thomas More, the Court closed with the stern observation that "in our constitutional system
the commitment to the separation of powers is too fundamental for us to pre-empt congressional action by judicially decreeing what accords with 'common sense and the public weal."'
Id. at 195. For concise legal histories of the case, including the events leading up to it, the
Court's internal deliberations, and the decision's aftermath, see Holly Doremus, The Story of
TVA v. Hill: A Narrow Escape for a Broad New Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 109
(Richard J. Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck eds., 2005); ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER, LITTLE FISH IN A
PORK BARREL: THE CLASSIC AMERICAN STORY OF THE ENDANGERED SNAIL DARTER AND THE
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUrHORrrY's FINAL DAM (forthcoming 2012); Zygmunt J.B. Plater, In the
Wake of the Snail Darter: an Environmental Law Paradigm and Its Consequences, 19 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 805 (1986). An in-depth journalistic history is provided in CHARLES C.
MANN & MARK L. PLUMMER, NOAHS CHOICE: THE FUTURE OF ENDANGERED SPECIES 164-69
(1996).
8Justice Powell predicted "[tihere will be little sentiment to leave this dam standing
before an empty reservoir, serving no purpose other than a conversation piece for incredulous
tourists." 437 U.S. at 210 (Powell, J., dissenting). The Wall Street Journal quipped that "the
Endangered Species Act is pretty silly." Scopes Prosecution Vindicated,WALL ST. J., June 16,
1978, at 16.
' For Congress's reaction, see Doremus, supra note 7, at 132-34.
0 See FREYFOGLE & GOBLE, supra note 1, at 237-38 ("For more than three decades,
endangered species protection has generated heated controversy."); Robert Infelise & Holly
Doremus, Annual Review of Environmentaland Natural Resources Law: Foreword, 37 EcOLoGY L.Q. 277, 279 (2010) (describing the ESA as "perhaps the most controversial of the
federal environmental protection laws").
" Daniel A. Farber, A Tale of Two Cases, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 33, 34 (2001) (noting that
Hill may be the best-known case in environmental law).
12See James Salzman & J.B. Ruh, Who's Number One?, ENvrn. F. (Envtl. Law Inst.,
D.C.), Nov.-Dec. 2009, at 36, 37-40. Hill ranked first in 2001 and fourth in 2009 in surveys
of environmental lawyers asking which cases are the most significant in the history of environmental law. Id. Hill also was selected for inclusion in an anthology published in 2005 collecting chapters discussing the most important cases in the history of environmental law. See
Doremus, supra note 7, at 109.
1 Hill is covered as a principal case in most environmental law casebooks active on the
market. See, e.g., ROBIN KuNDIs CRAIG, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN CONTEXT 326 (2d ed.
2008); ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 344

(5th ed. 2007);

J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE,
(4th ed. 2010); J.B. RUHL ET AL., THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 84 (2d ed. 2010).
14 Westlaw's "citing references" result for Hill shows hundreds of cases "examining" and
"discussing" the case, with hundreds more citing it.
15See, e.g., Jonathan Cannon, Environmentalism and the Supreme Court: A Cultural
Analysis, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 363, 413-18 (2006) (using Hill as a window into the Supreme
Court's views of the culture of environmentalism); Farber, supra note 11, passim (examining
Hill as an example of Supreme Court views on environmental law); Jan Hasselman, Holes in
the EndangeredSpecies Act Safety Net: The Role of Agency "Discretion" in Section 7 ConsulZYGMUNT
LAW, AND SOCIETY 430
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As it turns out, however, Hill has become the extreme outlier in the
Court's ESAjurisprudence. The Court remained silent on the ESA for over a
decade after deciding Hill, suggesting the opinion's strong language had
staying power. When the Court returned to the ESA in 1992, however, it
was clear the love affair was over. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife" was the

first in a series of four decisions spaced out over the next fifteen years, two
focusing on standing issues and two on ESA substance, the net result of
which was silently but unmistakably to eviscerate Hill. Indeed, dissenting
from the last decision in the series, 2007's National Association of Home
Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife," Justice Stevens claimed that "today the

Court turns its back on our decision in Hill and places a great number of
endangered species in jeopardy." 9 Hill may be important to many lawyers,
judges, and legal scholars, but it no longer enjoys special status in the Court.
Consequently, neither does the ESA.
This Article is the first to examine the ESA's remarkable fall from grace
in the Court, not only as a measure of where the statute has traveled in the
Court but also as an examination more broadly into where environmental
values and environmental law fit in the Court's jurisprudence and what that
suggests for the design of environmental law. It all starts, of course, with
Hill. The decision itself may still be an active topic in legal scholarship, but
Hill cannot fully be understood without accounting for what the Court has
done to take the wind from its sails. If Hill is a shining example of the
environment prevailing in the Court, why has the Court turned its back on it,
and without ever saying so directly? Why is Hill still considered so important by so many working in environmental law, when the Court has all but
abandoned it? Are there lessons to be learned about the Court and environmental law from Hill's diminished prestige in the Court's eyes? These questions are as important to ask about Hill as the questions asked about the
decision itself, yet they have gone untouched in legal scholarship.
To be sure, legal scholars have examined each of the cases in the
Court's ESA quintuplet, usually one or two at a time, to assess their meaning
for the ESA substantively or for the broader statutory interpretation and
tation, 25 STAN. ENvn. L.J. 125 (2006) (discussing early interpretations of the ESA evident in
Hill); Zygmunt J.B. Plater, EndangeredSpecies Act Lessons over 30 Years and the Legacy of
the Snail Darter,A Small Fish in a Porkbarrel,34 ENvTv. L. 289 passim (2004) (discussing
history and analysis of Hill).
6 The decision is well known not only for its ESA pedigree, but also for the Court's
approach to statutory interpretation, an aspect not covered in detail in this Article. See JOHN F.
MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 3 (2010) (using Hill
to introduce the subject of statutory interpretation). Hill's approach to injunctive relief also
remains a topic of scholarly focus. See, e.g., Brandon M. Middleton, Restoring Tradition: The
Inapplicabilityof TVA v. Hill's EndangeredSpecies Act Injunctive Relief Standardto Preliminary Injunctive Relief of Non-Federal Actors, 17 Mo. ENvm. L. & Pot'y REV. 318 (2010)
(arguing that the injunctive relief standard employed in Hill should not be applied to nonfederal actors).
17 504 U.S. 555 (1992).

' 551 U.S. 664 (2007).
" Id. at 694 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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standing doctrines involved. And legal scholars have examined the larger
body of the Court's environmental law cases to assess the Court's attitudes
toward the environment and the law of the environment. This Article takes a
different approach of using all five of the Court's ESA decisions as a case
study for exploring the Court, the environment, and environmental law. I
recognize that five cases makes for a small-scale study for such large-scale
questions. Indeed, perhaps these five cases are better thought of as three
statutory interpretation cases and two standing cases, with the ESA serving
merely as the medium for the messages, in which case they do not tell us
much at all about these questions. But they are the only five instances in
which the Court has spoken directly about the ESA, 20 which is unquestionably one of the nation's most prominent and controversial environmental
laws, and in none of the cases could the Court reasonably be described as
having portrayed the ESA as mere window dressing.
Part I of this Article provides brief overviews of the ESA, the Court's
ESA cases, and the Justices' voting patterns to situate the four post-Hill decisions in their statutory and jurisprudential contexts. Perhaps each of the
cases was decided on perfectly reasonable grounds for the statutory interpretation or standing doctrines involved. I am no expert in either of those domains, and I take no position here as to whether the Court arrived at the
correct descriptions and interpretations of the ESA. My central theme,
rather, is that the arc of the decisions and history of the Justices' voting
records point unmistakably and relentlessly toward the decline of Hill and,
with it, the ESA.
The body of the Article then moves through three lessons Hill's hostile
successors have to offer. First, Part II uses the history of the cases as a
window into the Court's overall approach to the environment and environmental values. Several legal scholars have worked to identify different
themes from the Court's environmental jurisprudence - for example,
whether it is pro-environment, pro-business, pro-government, or simply inscrutable.2 1 All agree, however, that the Court's relationship with the envi20 I recognize as well that the Court has declined to take up consideration of numerous
ESA decisions from the lower courts, which may or may not tell us something about the
Court's views on the ESA, the environment, and environmental law. Because of the speculation required to interpret the meaning of certiorari denial, however, I do not include analysis of
such cases. But see infra note 218.
21 The most prolific scholar of the Court and environmental law has been Professor Richard Lazarus. See Richard J. Lazarus, The Nature of Environmental Law and the U.S. Supreme
Court, in STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SUCCESS IN AN UNCERTAIN JUDICIAL CLIMATE 9
(Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2005) [hereinafter Lazarus, Nature of Environmental Law]; Richard
J. Lazarus, Restoring What's EnvironmentalAbout EnvironmentalLaw in the Supreme Court,
47 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 703 (2000) [hereinafter Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental];
Richard J. Lazarus, Thirty Years of Environmental Protection Law in the Supreme Court, 17
PACE ENvT. L. REv. 1 (1999) [hereinafter Lazarus, Thirty Years of EnvironmentalProtection
Law]; see also Jonathan H. Adler, Business, the Environment, and the Roberts Court: A Preliminary Assessment, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 943 (2009); Daniel A. Farber, Is the Supreme
Court Irrelevant? Reflections on the Judicial Role in Environmental Law, 81 MINN. L. Rv.
548 (1997); Stephen M. Johnson, The Roberts Court and the Environment, 37 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REv. 317 (2010); Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Judicial Activism and
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ronment has been a disappointment to environmentalists for decades. 22 Solid
wins for the environment in the Court since 1970 are rare. 23 Hill being one
of the first, its downfall confirms other scholars' assessments of the Court's
environmental attitude over time as exhibiting apathy, ignorance, and even
hostility.
But my central thesis is that there is more to the ESA's decline than the
Court's realization that it had departed in Hill from its usual approach to the
environment and its subsequent efforts to correct the error. Part III argues
that another driving causal agent has been the evolution of the ESA, through
administrative reform, from a novelty in environmental law to a broad and
robust regulatory program. Hill likely happened - that is, the environment
won in the Court - precisely because the ESA was seen as the odd bird
among environmental laws in the 1970s, capable of stopping a federal dam
but seemingly posing no broad regulatory constraints on private landowner
and business interests. Over time, however, changes in agency implementation of the ESA gave the statute the qualities of the "big" pollution control
statutes, with expansive jurisdiction over land use, 24 complex regulations, 25
expensive and time-consuming permitting, 26 and a gristmill of environmentalist litigation.27 The more the ESA began to look like the other environmental laws, the less the Court liked it and the more receptive the Court
became to appeals by business interests for protection from the ESA's regulatory burdens. While the evidence from the ESA's fall from grace supports
the view that the Court has been apathetic about, confused about, and even
hostile to the environment, the better explanation for what has happened to
the ESA is that the Court is skeptical about environmental law.
Restraintin the Supreme Court'sEnvironmental Law Decisions, 42 VAND. L. REV. 343 (1989);
Albert C. Lin, Erosive Interpretation of Environmental Law in the Supreme Court's 2003-04
Term, 42 Hous. L. REv. 565 (2005); Kenneth A. Manaster, Justice Stevens, Judicial Power,
and the Varieties of Environmental Litigation, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 1963 (2006); Peter Manus, Five Against the Environment, 44 NEw ENG. L. REV. 221 (2010); Jay D. Wexler, The
(Non)Uniqueness of Environmental Law, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 260 (2006).
22 See, e.g., Lazarus, Thirty Years of Environmental Protection Law, supra note 21, at 12
(concluding that the Court's "overall trends suggest a troubling result for those looking to the
Court to have an affirmative interest in promoting environmental protection"); Manaster,
supra note 21, at 1964 ("The desire of environmental activists for ringing judicial pronouncements of environmental awareness . . . has not been satisfied, at least not to the degree originally hoped for and not by the Supreme Court.").
23 See Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental, supra note 21, at 737 (identifying Hill as
among the handful of the "significant, albeit rare, victories for environmental concerns in the
Supreme Court").
24 See generally infra Part IV.A.
25 See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. pt. 402 (laying out the procedures for federal agencies
to assess the
effects
26 of their actions on endangered species).
See, e.g., U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT. MARINE FISHERIEs SERV., HABITAT
CONSERVATION PLANNING AND INCIDENTAL TAKE PERMIT PROCESSING HANDBOOK (1996),
available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/pdfs/aws/hcp-handbook.pdf (containing several
hundred pages of guidance on ESA permitting processes); see generally infra Part HI.
27 Litigation under the ESA is active and contentious, as documented annually in a summary of litigation developments I have authored each of the past fifteen years for the American
Bar Association's Section on Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources. See, e.g., J.B.
Ruhl, EndangeredSpecies: 2010 Annual Report, in THE YEAR IN REVIEw 2010, at 52 (2011).
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Part IV closes by extracting what can be learned from the history of the
ESA in the Court for the design of environmental law. Ironically, Hill exposed the qualities of the ESA that pose the greatest risk for environmental
laws in the Court: it regulates land use with little direct connection to public
health or welfare; it has weak foundations in cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis; and it is easily accused of disproportionate and often inequitable distribution of benefits and burdens. With these characteristics, the ESA
stood little chance of staying on its pedestal for long in the Court. How,
then, might we design a law with the ESA's purposes in mind but shield it
from the kind of assault the ESA has suffered in the Court? Part IV suggests
several strategies, none of which is likely to be palatable to environmental
protection interests.
Notwithstanding its obsolescence in the Court's jurisprudence, Hill will
never completely fade away. Its historical importance is etched on environmental law. It will always be represented on the crest of environmentalism,
serve as the bogeyman for critics of the ESA, and be pulled out of the hat
when a sentimental reference to the ESA's glory days seems appropriate.
But the ESA has lost its luster in the Court, where it now receives no more
respect than any other environmental statute, which is to say not much.
Hill's story -

the full account -

thus is the story of the environment and

environmental law in the Court's jurisprudence. Surely this is not a cheerful
thought for environmentalists, though it may be comforting to property and
business interests. My focus, however, is more pragmatic than political how might we design future environmental laws to avoid what has happened
to the ESA?
I.

THE FALL FROM GRACE

An advantage of using the ESA as a window into the Court's environmental jurisprudence is that the relevant statutory provisions - the parts of
the statute that the Court has engaged - have remained relatively stable
throughout the history of the statute in the Court." Legislative changes in
the statute itself, therefore, cannot explain the Court's change of heart.
By contrast, the composition of the Court has changed quite a bit over
the ESA's run in the Court. But the Court's membership has not changed in
a way that fully explains what the Court has done to the ESA over the past
three decades. As Table 1 at the end of this part of the Article shows, of the
eighteen Justices who have voted in at least one of the Court's ESA cases,
five left the Court between Hill and the next of the ESA cases, Lujan. According to an extensive empirical analysis Professor Richard Lazarus performed of the Court's environmental voting records from 1969 to 1999, of
those five, Justices Brennan and Marshall had relatively strong pro-environmental voting records, Justices Burger and Powell had anti-environmental
28

ESA amendments are discussed infra note 169.
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records, and Justice Stewart was in the middle.29 Justice Stevens voted in all
five of the cases, and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, Souter, and Thomas voted in
the four post-Hill cases. Justice Stevens and post-Hill Court members Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer are among the most pro-environmental in the
Court's history, whereas Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas
are among the most anti-environmental.3 0
Overall, in other words, the Burger Court does not look much different
from later eras as far as the balance of environmental voting records is concerned. To be sure, even small changes in the Court's composition can dramatically change the Court's tenor. Indeed, some environmental law
scholars have identified the Roberts Court as decidedly antagonistic to environmental interests,3 1 but the Lazarus study suggests the Court on balance
had been leaning that way for decades before the Roberts Court era. In any
event, even if the Roberts Court tilts against the environment more than its
predecessors,32 the change in the Court's composition does not on its face
appear sufficient to explain the ESA's radically downward trend in the
Court's decisions, which began in earnest well before the Roberts Court with
Lujan in 1992. It may have some explanatory power, but it is too easy to
attribute the demise of the ESA to changes in Court composition and leave it
at that. Something more must have been going on over the past thirty years
to lead the Court to fully abandon Hill and reduce the ESA to the status of a
plain vanilla environmental law. To allow deeper analysis of that trend in
later parts of the Article, therefore, this part provides the necessary descriptive background on the statute, the cases, and the Justice's voting records.
A.

The Statute

Widely regarded as the "pit bull" of environmental laws,33 the ESA's
central purpose is to "provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which
endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved."3 4
The agencies delegated to administer the ESA, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife

29 See Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental, supra note 21, at 725 (depicting a chart
showing each Justice's environmental protection score).
30 See id. Given the time frame, the study does not assess the two other Justices who
voted in ESA cases, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito.
3 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 21, passim; Manus, supra note 21, passim.
3 Professor Stephen Johnson has updated the Lazarus study, using the same methodology,
to assign environmental voting scores to the Roberts Court Justices, finding that in that period
(2005 through 2008 Terms) there is a more pronounced pattern of pro-environmental voting by
Justices Ginsburg, Souter, Breyer, and Stevens and continued anti-environmental voting by
Justices Alito, Kennedy, Roberts, Scalia, and Thomas. See Johnson, supra note 21, at 348-49.
" Steven P. Quarles, The Pit Bull Goes to School, ENVTL. F., Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 55
(discussing the origins of this reputation); see also Steven P. Quarles & Thomas R. Lundquist,
The Pronounced Presence and Insistent Issues of the ESA, 16 NATURAL REs. & ENv'r 59
(2001) (giving additional historical context to highlight the Act's "overbearing statutory
certainty").
* 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2006).
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Service ("FWS") for the Department of the Interior and the National Marine
Fisheries Service ("NMFS") for the Department of Commerce,35 have authority over several core programs aimed toward that objective:
The Listing Programs: Section 4 authorizes the agencies to identify "endangered" and "threatened" species, known as the listing
function, 6 and then to designate "critical habitat"" and develop
"recovery plans"" for the species.
Interagency Consultations: Section 7 requires all federal agencies

to "consult" with the FWS or NMFS (depending on the species)
to ensure that actions they carry out, fund, or authorize do not
"jeopardize" the continued existence of listed species or "adverse[ly] modif[y]" their critical habitat. 9
The Take Prohibition:Section 9 requires that all persons, including
all private and public entities subject to federal jurisdiction, avoid
committing "take" of listed species of fish and wildlife. 40
Incidental Take Permits: Sections 7 (for federal agency actions) 41
and 10 (for actions not subject to section 7, e.g., for state and private action) 42 establish a procedure and criteria for the FWS and
NMFS to approve "incidental take" of listed species. 43
" The FWS administers the ESA for all terrestrial, freshwater, and certain other specified
species, and NMFS (also known as NOAA-Fisheries) administers the ESA for most marine
species and anadromous fish. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b) (2008).
36 16 U.S.C. § 1522(a)(1); see generally LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 1, at 13-27;
STANFORD ENvTL. LAW Soc'Y, supra note 1, 38-58; SULLINS, supra note 1, at 11-25; J.B.
Ruhl, Section 4 of the ESA: The Keystone of Species Protection Law, in LAW, PoLIcy, AND
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 1, at 16.
3 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3); see generally LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 1, at 29-34;
STANFORD ENVTL. LAW Soc'v, supra note 1, 59-69; SULLINS, supra note 1, at 26-28; Federico
Cheever, Endangered Species Act: Critical Habitat, in LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 1, at 40; Murray D. Feldman & Michael J. Brennan, The Growing Importance of
Critical Habitatfor Species Conservation, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENVr 88 (2001).
38 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f); see generally LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 1, at 35-38;
STANFORD ENVTL. LAW Soc'v, supra note 1, at 71-77; SULLINS, supra note 1, at 34-37; Dale
D. Goble, Recovery, in LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 1, at 70.
' 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2); see generally LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 1, at 39-62;
STANFORD ENvTL. LAW SOC'Y, supra note 1, at 83-103; SULLINS, supra note 1, at 59-86;
Patrick W. Ryan & Erika E. Malmen, Interagency Consultation Under Section 7, in LAW,
POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 1, at 104, 104-25.
40 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1); see generally LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 1, at 63-72;
STANFORD ENvTL. LAW Soc'Y, supra note 1, at 104-12; SULLINS, supra note 1, at 44-54; Alan
M. Glen & Craig M. Douglas, Taking Species: Difficult Questions of Proximity and Degree, 16
NAT. RESOURCES & ENVY 65 (2001); Patrick Parenteau, The Take Prohibition, in LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 1, at 146; Quarles & Lundquist, supra note 33, at 63.

16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4).
Id. § 1539(a)(1).
"Incidental take," although not explicitly defined in a specific
43 Id. § 1539(a)(1)(B).

41
42

statutory provision, is described in section 10 of the statute as take that is "incidental to, and
not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity." Id. The FWS, for exam-

ple, has adopted this meaning in regulations implementing incidental take authorization under
section 7. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2011). For a description of the incidental take authorization
procedures, see LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 1, at 73-81; STANFORD ENVTL. LAW
Soc'Y, supra note 1, at 127-73; SULLINS, supra note 1, at 87-102.
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These four programs are designed to intervene in several categories of
environmental change that cause species decline: (1) the present or
threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment of habitat; (2) over-utilization for commercial, recreational, scientific, or educational purposes; (3)
disease or predation; (4) the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms;
and (5) other natural or manmade factors." While few species listed for
protection under the ESA have fully recovered, the statute is credited with
preventing the extinction of the vast majority of listed species.45
As with many environmental laws, the ESA also includes a broad provision for enforcement in administrative and judicial forums, including a
"citizen suits" procedure allowing any person to seek civil enforcement
against alleged violators of the statute and any agency that does not fulfill
nondiscretionary duties. 46 The Hill litigation was brought pursuant to this
provision. In fact, all five of the Court's ESA cases were brought as citizen
suits, and it is quite telling about the statute's history in the Court to see who
those citizens were in each case.
B.

The Cases

In the decade after Hill elevated the ESA to royalty status among environmental laws, the Court did not revisit the legislation's virtues. For the
time being, Hill must have said all the Court needed to say. These were the
ESA's glory days.
Yet this empowered version of the ESA soon began to generate friction
with landowners over property rights, with industry over cost, and with environmental groups over implementation and enforcement. 47 One might reasonably have expected the Court to confront ESA cases many times and, if
Hill was any indication, to reaffirm the statute's strength and vitality each
time.
Matters have turned out quite differently, however, as the Court has
taken the opportunity to engage the ESA in any meaningful way only four
times since Hill, in each case taking the statute down a substantial notch in
status. This gradual but unmistakable reversal of fortune took place on alternating fronts. In two cases the ESA served as the medium for the Court to
address the constitutional or statutory law of standing, and in the course of
doing so provide observations about the ESA. In the other two cases the
Court dealt squarely with substantive interpretation of the ESA, in one case

4

16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)(A)-(E) (prescribing the factors upon which listing decisions are

made).
4 See J. Michael Scott et al., By the Numbers, in THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT
THIRTY, supra note 1, at 16, 29-32 (summarizing quantitative measures of ESA success).
46 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g); see generally Eric R. Glitzenstein, Citizen Suits, in LAW, POLICY,

AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 1, at 260; LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra
STANFORD ENvTL. LAW Soc'Y, supra note 1, at 202-16.
47
See, e.g., STANFORD ENvTL. LAW Soc'Y, supra note 1, at 24-30.
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to define the scope of the statute's regulatory reach and in the other to explain how the ESA interfaces with other environmental statutes.
The Court's ESA cases thus provide five well-spaced points defining
the arc of the ESA's history in the Court. Alas, as the following case discussions show, it has been more of a free fall.
1.

Starting at the Apogee - TVA v. Hill

Hill is a classic David (armed with a fish) versus Goliath (armed with a
dam) story of environmental citizen suit litigation. Hiram Hill was a law
student in search of a paper topic who, with the help of his law professor,
Zygmunt Plater, wound up in the Supreme Court. The account of how they
got there is fit for Hollywood, but suffice it to say for purposes of this Article that the case arrived in the Court notwithstanding relentless efforts of the
TVA, the Tennessee congressional delegation, and influential members of
the Carter Administration.48 Having survived those gauntlets, two discrete
legal issues framed the case: (1) would TVA violate the interagency consultation and jeopardy prohibition provisions of section 7 of the ESA by completing the dam and impounding the reservoir, an act which was then
believed to be the death knell for the snail darter as a species; and (2) if so,
did the courts have equitable powers to deny an injunction given how far
advanced construction of the dam had progressed and given the (purported)
economic importance of the reservoir project? 49 The prevailing answers
were "yes" to the first issue and "no" to the second.
Hill was a 6-3 decision in the fish's favor, with the central dispute taking place between Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, and Justice
Powell, dissenting. 0 All sides accepted "the premise that operation of the
Tellico Dam will either eradicate the known population of snail darters or
destroy their critical habitat.""1 That premise, while ultimately requiring revision upon later discoveries of snail darter populations elsewhere,5 2 drove
the Court toward a battle of statutory interpretation. Section 7 then plainly
stated that federal agencies must "insure that actions authorized, funded, or
carried out by them do not jeopardize the continued existence" of listed
species." Chief Justice Burger observed that "one would be hard pressed to
find a statutory provision whose terms were any plainer,"5 4 concluding that
completing the dam would violate the statute, whereas Justice Powell found
the term "actions" limited to "prospective actions, i.e., actions with respect
48

See Doremus, supra note 7, at 120-26.

TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 172 (1978).
" Chief Justice Burger wrote the opinion for the majority and was joined by Justices
Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, Stewart, and White. See id. at 156. Justice Powell wrote a dissent
joined by Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist. Id. at 195. Justice Rehnquist also filed a separate
dissent on the question of injunctive relief. Id. at 211.
4

5'

Id. at 171.

See Doremus, supra note 7, at 134-35.
U.S. at 173.
54
52

53437

Id.
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to which the agency is deciding whether to authorize, fund, or to carry
out.""5 The dam being almost completed, Justice Powell reasoned that the
time for decision was long past.
Observing that the language of section 7 "admits of no exception," the
majority opinion refused to "ignore the ordinary meaning of plain language"
even while accepting that "this view of the Act will produce results requiring the sacrifice of the anticipated benefits of the project and of many millions of dollars of public funds."56 Pulling no punches, Justice Powell
invoked the absurdity doctrine of statutory interpretation,5 7 arguing that a
statute "may be construed in a way that avoids an 'absurd result' without
doing violence to its language."" He found support for his interpretation in
congressional appropriations committee reports calling for completion of the
dam, 9 but the majority found that this fell short of persuasive legislative
history, and could not be said to have had the legislative effect of a repeal of
the ESA for the dam.so
Much of the strong language the majority used to describe the ESA thus
was designed to squeeze all ambiguity out of the term "actions" and to discount the economic arguments in favor of finishing the dam, so as to leave
no crack in the door for Justice Powell's appeal to the absurdity doctrine.
Yet, bluntly hinting that it did not necessarily find the outcome palatable, the
majority observed that "it is not for us to speculate, much less act, on
whether Congress would have altered its stance had the specific events of
this case been anticipated," 61 and that judges' "individual appraisal of the
wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course consciously selected by Congress is to be put aside in the process of interpreting a statute." 62 It is not for
judges, in other words, "to preempt congressional action by judicially decreeing what accords with 'common sense and the public weal.' "63 Indeed,
the backstory on Hill suggests Chief Justice Burger considered the opinion
nothing less than "serv[ing] notice on Congress that it should take care of
its own 'chestnuts.' "6 Nevertheless, while it may have felt painted into a
corner by Congress and Justice Powell's aggressive stance, the majority's
review of the statutory language and legislative history led, in its view, to the
inexorable conclusion that "the plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the
cost," 65 and that section 7 "reveals a conscious decision by Congress to give

" Id. at 205 (Powell, J., dissenting).
56 Id. at 173-74.
17 See MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 16, at 85-101 (explaining the absurdity
doctrine).
58437 U.S. at 204-05 (Powell, J., dissenting).
' Id. at 207-11 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 189-93.
61
Id. at 185.
62
Id. at 194.
63 Id. at 195.
" Doremus, supra note 7, at 131 (quoting internal papers of the Court).
65437 U.S. at 184.
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endangered species priority over the 'primary missions' of federal agencies."6 6 In short, the fish wins.
2.

Standing (Round I) - Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife

The ESA's section 7 interagency consultation provisions at issue in Hill
figured prominently once again in the next opportunity the Court had to take
up the statute, its 1992 decision in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.67 A number of environmental groups challenged a rule the FWS and NMFS promulgated in 1986 limiting the geographic scope of the jeopardy prohibition to
actions federal agencies carry out, fund, or authorize in the United States and
on the high seas. This 1986 rule revised the position the agencies had
adopted in a 1978 rule extending the scope to federal agency actions in foreign nations.66 The lower courts sided with the environmental groups and
ordered the agencies to resurrect the 1978 rule. 69 However, the district court
and Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals had disagreed over whether the environmental groups had standing to challenge the rule. 70 Although the appellate court resolved the issue in favor of allowing the suit and then reached
the merits to decide against the government's new position, standing, not the
merits, became the decisive question in the Supreme Court."
Justice Scalia wrote for a 6-3 balance of the Court on the standing question,72 ruling that the environmental groups did not satisfy the three essential
requirements the Constitution demands for courts to entertain a plaintiff's
claim: concrete injury in fact to the plaintiff, causation of the injury by the
defendant, and redressibility of the injury by the courts.73 The Court found
that the environmental groups had demonstrated no separate concrete interests that would be injured, such as firm plans to visit or research protected
species in foreign countries where the agencies were failing to conduct consultations; rather, they had alleged injuries such as harm to ecosystems in
general and to their personal concerns about the well-being of species
abroad, neither of which the majority found sufficiently concrete.7 4 Without

6

Id. at 185.

67 504 U.S. 555
68 Id. at 558.

(1992).

Id. at 559.
Id. at 559.
71 Id. at 559.
72 The Court's breakdown was complex. On the standing issue, Justice Scalia wrote an
opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas
joined in whole or in part, which was sufficient to rule for the government on standing. Justices Blackmun, O'Connor, and Stevens would have found the plaintiffs had standing. The
decision was actually 7-2 in favor of the government, but one vote was from Justice Stevens,
who dissented on the standing issue but concurred in the judgment for the government because
he found that the rule limiting the reach of the ESA to domestic actions was consistent with the
statute. See id. at 581 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens was the only member of the
Court to address the merits of the extraterritoriality question.
7
1Id. at 560-61.
74
Id. at 565-71.
69

70
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more at stake, their alleged "procedural injury" alone did not confer
standing."
To decide the standing issue that way, Justice Scalia's opinion had to
make two substantive observations about the ESA that suggested the luster
Hill put on the statute was beginning to dull. First, it is up to the agency
taking an action, not the FWS or NMFS, to decide whether an action requires consultation under section 7(a)(2) to determine compliance with the
jeopardy prohibition. 6 Second, the consultation between the action-taking
agency and the FWS or NMFS is not the kind of procedure in which third
parties have any direct participation rights that could be injured should the
agencies disregard or improperly conduct the procedure. 77 Hence the Court
portrayed the consultation procedure -

the procedure sainted in Hill -

as

an agency black box shielded from public scrutiny.
But Justice Scalia's opinion does not mention Hill in either of these
respects. Ironically, his sole reference to Hill comes at the opening of the
decision, where he cites the opinion for the proposition that the ESA "seeks
to protect species of animals against threats to their continuing existence
caused by man."" Reducing Hill's "whatever the cost" rhetoric into authority for describing the ESA.as a statute that merely seeks to protect species is
a rather tepid reading. Hill receives absolutely no play in the remainder of
Justice Scalia's opinion.
One might have expected the Justices dissenting on the standing issue
to use Hill as a means of calling attention to the importance of the ESA and
its consultation procedure. After all, if a law student could stop the powerful
and parochial TVA from completing a nearly finished dam in Tennessee,
why not give standing to citizens with just as strong an interest in species
conservation to require agencies financing projects in other countries to
comply with section 7? But Justice Blackmun's and Justice Stevens's opinions finding that the plaintiffs had standing draw'no energy from Hill.
The only Justice to reach the merits of the extraterritorial jurisdiction
question, Justice Stevens, substantially refuted Hill's message by finding that
the statute does not have extraterritorial reach. Justice Stevens cites Hill
only once, for the proposition that "Congress recognized that one of the
'major causes' of extinction of endangered species is the 'destruction of natural habitat.' "" From there, however, he convolutedly reasoned that this
congressional purpose bolsters the case for not applying the statute extraterritorially. Pointing to the language of section 7, he found that "nothing in
this text indicates that the section applies in foreign countries."s0 In other
7 Id. at
16 Id. at

571-78.
568-69 ("[Wlith respect to consultation the initiative, and hence arguably the
initial responsibility for determining statutory necessity, lies with the [action-taking]
agencies.").
77
Id. at 571-78.
78
Id. at 558.
7 Id. at 587-88 (Stevens, J., concurring).
s Id. at 586 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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words, the statutory provision that Hill instructs us was part of the most
comprehensive species conservation legislation ever enacted, that admits of
no exception, makes endangered species protection a priority over the primary missions of federal agencies, and is intended to reverse species decline
whatever the cost, is in his view, "not sufficient to overcome the presumption against the extraterritorial application of statutes."" While it is true that
the ESA contains no affirmative expression of extraterritorial reach,8 2 Justice
Stevens's conclusion did not bode well for Hill or the ESA.
3.

Substance (Round I) - Sweet Home

It was almost two decades after Hill before the Court directly revisited
the substance of the ESA in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities

for a Great Oregon. 3 Property rights interests had launched a frontal assault
on an FWS regulation defining the scope of the section 9 prohibition against
"take" of protected fish and wildlife species.' The ESA defines take to
include both the obvious, such as to kill or wound, and the amorphous, such
as to harm or harass." By regulation, the FWS had defined harm to include
modification of a species' habitat if it leads to actual death or injury,"6 but
property rights interests argued that Congress intended "take" to encompass
only acts involving direct application of force toward a protected species,
not habitat modification that indirectly leads to injury.87 The D.C. Circuit
initially sided with the government, but then reversed itself on rehearing in a
divided opinion, which created a split in the courts of appeals.8
In another 6-3 ruling, 9 the Court agreed with the government on the
basis that "Congress' intent to provide comprehensive protection for endangered and threatened species supports the permissibility of the . . . 'harm'

regulation." 0 This "comprehensive protection" thesis leaned heavily on
Hill, from which the majority quoted liberally and described as having
"stressed the importance of the statutory policy." 9' Extending the take prohibition to include habitat modification that indirectly injures or kills a pro-

8

Id. at 586 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring).
* Cf EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (noting that the "affirmative intention of Congress" to apply a statute extraterritorially must be "clearly expressed").
83 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
" 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (2006).
85
Id. § 1532(19).
86
See 515 U.S. at 691.
* See id. at 693-95.
8 See id. at 694-95. For background on the lower court decisions and the split in the
courts of appeals, see STANFORD ENvn. LAW Soc'v, supra note 1, at 106-09; Quarles &
Lundquist, supra note 33, at 161-68.
" Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion in which Justices Breyer, Ginsberg, Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter joined, and Justice O'Connor wrote a separate concurring opinion.
Justice Scalia wrote a dissent in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined. 515
U.S. at 688.
90Id. at 699.
91 Id.
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tected species thus "extend[s] protection against activities that cause the
precise harms Congress enacted the statute to avoid." 2
Although on its surface the majority's decision appears to endorse Hill
and the ESA's regulatory power and to open the door to broad enforcement
of the take prohibition in the courts, in practical terms the opinion substantially undercuts the take prohibition. Some lower courts previously had
found take violations in contexts of extenuated causation and on the basis of
population trends rather than actual proof of harm to identifiable members of
a protected species. 93 The Sweet Home decision tightened the take analysis
by making it clear that proof of a harm violation is measured under tort-like
tests of "ordinary requirements of proximate causation and foreseeability"
and of "but for" causation, 94 and that the plaintiff also must establish "injury
to particular animals."95 The combined effect of these principles being injected into the ESA's principal regulatory arm was a stunning blow to the
statute's vitality. Because it can be quite difficult to prove that habitat modification is the proximate, foreseeable, and "but for" cause of actual death or
injury to particular members of a protected species, 96 Sweet Home can be
seen as a Pyrrhic victory for the government and environmental groups.
To be sure, this outcome was not as devastating to the ESA as would
have been the case had Justice Scalia's version of the statute prevailed. InId. at 698.
* See, e.g., Palila v. Haw. Dep't of Land & Natural Res., 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).
* 515 U.S. at 696 n.9 (stating that the harm regulation "incorporate[s] ordinary requirements of proximate cause and foreseeability"); id. at 700 n. 13 (noting that "the regulation ...
is subject to . . . ordinary requirements of proximate causation and foreseeability" and "'but
for' causation" is "obviously require[d]"); id. at 700 ("Congress had in mind foreseeable
rather than merely accidental effects on listed species.").
" Id. at 700 n.13; see also id. at 697 (stating that the term harm "naturally encompasses
habitat modification that results in actual injury or death to members of an endangered or
threatened species").
96 See generally BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 1, at 216 ("The difficulty of transferring
this concept from tort law to endangered species conservation is that what is easily foreseeable
to those with a modicum of training in natural history may not be foreseeable to those who
hold widely prevalent, but erroneous, views of ecology and animal behavior."); Glen & Douglas, supra note 40, at 68-69 (summarizing the difficulties in proving a harm claim after Sweet
Home); id. at 132 (explaining that "[t]he Court's strict construction of the rule has led most
lower courts to bear a heavy burden of proof"); Quarles & Lundquist, supra note 33, at 63
(summarizing the difficulties in proving a harm claim after Sweet Home); James R. Rasband,
Priority,Probability,and Proximate Cause: Lessons from Tort Law About Imposing ESA Responsibilityfor Wildlife Harm on Water Users and Other Joint Habitat Modifiers, 33 ENvt.
L. 595, 618 (2003) ("[P]ost-Sweet Home case law appears to be taking a narrow view of when
habitat modification will be considered the proximate cause of harm to a protected species.").
The uncertainty as to when habitat modification will meet the proximate cause test imposes its
own indirect constraints on habitat modification from land development, as risk-averse lenders
and partners of a development project may demand the project resolve the risk of noncompliance either by limiting the project's habitat impacts or by obtaining incidental take authorization from the FWS or NMFS. Moreover, if incidental take authorization is sought, the
uncertainty works in the agency's favor in terms of assessing the extent to which the project
will cause a take, an administrative determination a court would review deferentially. See J.B.
Ruhl, How to Kill Endangered Species, Legally: The Nuts and Bolts of Endangered Species
Act "HCP" Permitsfor Real Estate Development, 5 ENvT. L. 345, 361-62, 376, 391-93
(1999).
92
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voking the familiar noscitur a sociis canon of statutory construction,97 he
sided with the view that the word "harm" must be construed to draw its
meaning from the words around it in the "take" definition, such as kill and
shoot, all of which "are directed immediately and intentionally against a
particular animal - not acts or omissions that indirectly and accidentally
cause injury to a population of animals." 8 Limiting the take prohibition to
such acts would have rendered the provision little more than an anti-hunting
measure, so in this sense his failure to garner a majority can be seen as a
victory for the environment. 9 But the Sweet Home majority's hard-nosed
tort law approach to species protection can hardly be interpreted as a ringing
endorsement of Hill or a shot of adrenaline for the ESA.
4.

Standing (Round II) - Bennett v. Spear

Because Lujan addressed only the requirements for standing under Article III of the Constitution, the question remained open as to what further
standing requirements the statute imposed. In Bennett v. Spear,'" a unanimous Court provided the answer: none. The Court has long enforced the
jurisprudential principle that regulatory statutes inherently limit standing to
the "zone of interests" the statute is intended to protect.' 0' The plaintiffs in
Bennett were ranchers complaining that by limiting flows of irrigation water
from federal projects to protect an endangered sucker fish, the FWS was
over-regulating their access to water through the section 7 jeopardy prohibition.102 Clearly, it would seem at first blush, this is not a claim within the
"zone" of protecting imperiled species. But the ESA contains a citizen suit
provision allowing "any person" to sue any other person, including the FWS
and other federal agencies, for violating the statute. 03 The ranchers alleged
the FWS had violated the statute by not following the ESA's directive that
the agency must reach its jeopardy consultation decisions using the "best
scientific data available."1t 4 The lower courts shut the doors to that claim
based on the zone of interests test, and the Supreme Court unanimously
reversed. 10

With Justice Scalia delivering the opinion, 06 the Court held that the
"any person" feature of the citizen suit provision flatly negated the general
" See

MANNING

&

STEPHENSON,

supra note 16, at 245-47.

9 515 U.S. at 720 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
9 See Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental, supra note 21, at 737 (counting Sweet

Home as among the rare environmental victories).
' 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
'O' Id. at 162-63.
02
1 Id. at 157-59.
103Id.

at 164; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13) (2006) (defining person broadly); id.

§ 1540(g) (providing for citizen suits).
104

520 U.S. at 176-77.

105

Id. at 156-57, rev'g Bennett v. Plenert, 63 F.3d 916, 919 (9th Cir. 1995), aft'g No. 93-

6067-HO, 1993 WL 669429, at *5 (D. Or. Nov. 18, 1993).
'0 Other members of the Court at the time were Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy, O'Connor, Souter, Stevens, and Thomas.
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zone of interest test, thus opening the door to suits against the agencies by
commercial, agricultural, recreational, and other economic interests.'10 This
alone seems oddly out of sync with Hill's description of the ESA's purposes,10 but Justice Scalia did not stop there.
Although the Court found that the citizen suit provision preempts the
prudential zone of interests test, thus making the ranchers' interests in suing
irrelevant, the Court ultimately found that their claims alleged mere "maladministration" of the consultation procedure, not actual violations of the statute as required in the citizen suit provision." That kind of claim, the Court
reasoned, had to be brought under the Administrative Procedure Act, 1 0 to
which the zone of interest test does apply."' But the Court found that the
ranchers did in fact have a protected interest under the ESA through the
requirement in section 7 that the agency base its decisions on the "best scientific . . . data available.""l 2 That requirement, the unanimous Court explained, is intended "to ensure that the ESA not be implemented
haphazardly, on the basis of speculation" and "to avoid needless economic
dislocation produced by agency officials zealously but unintelligently pursuing their environmental objectives."' Hence the ranchers' "claim that they
are victims of such a mistake is plainly within the zone of interests that the
provision protects."ll4
The fact that Bennett was a unanimous opinion pokes a rather large hole
in any thesis that changes in the Court's composition fully explain the ESA's
fall from grace, as several of the Court's strongest pro-environmental voters
- Justices Breyer, Ginsberg, Stevens, and Souter" - joined in Justice
Scalia's opinion. That a unanimous Court would endorse concern over the
potential for zealously unintelligent, economically disruptive implementation of the ESA seems a far cry from Hill's protect "at any cost" theme.
Indeed, if it is any invitation to judicial intervention in ESA administration,
Bennett suggests courts should be wary of agency "overenforcement" of the
ESA's species protection regulatory provisions." 6 Not surprisingly, Hill
shows up nowhere in the opinion.
107 520

U.S. at 165-66.

'osTVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 178 (1978) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 93-412, at 4-5 (1973));
see also supra Part I.B.1.
0 5 2 0 U.S. at 173-74.
1105 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2006).

"1 520 U.S. at 174-76. For a detailed explanation of the division between ESA citizen
suits and APA actions that Bennett created, see Glitzenstein, supra note 46, at 260, 265-70. Of
course, Bennett's doctrine is not limited to ESA cases, and thus the opinion is considered a
major force in standing law generally. See William W. Buzbee, Expanding the Zone, Tilting
the Field: Zone of Interests andArticle III Standing Analysis after Bennett v. Spear, 49 ADMIN.
L. REv. 763 (1997); Sam Kalen, Standing on Its Lst Legs: Bennett v. Spear and the Pastand
Future of Standing in Environmental Cases, 13 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 1 (1997).
112 16 U.S.C.
113 520 U.S.
4

§ 1536(a)(2); 520 U.S. at 176-77.
at 176-77.

Id. at 177.
"' See discussion supra note 32.
I

116 520

U.S. at 166 (explaining that the citizen suit is available "to actions against the
Secretary asserting overenforcement under § 1533").
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Substance (Round II) - Home Builders

Ten years passed after Bennett before the Court took up the ESA again.
In National Association of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife,"' a 5-4

majority of the Court finished the about-face from Hill by deciding that the
FWS and NMFS had reasonably interpreted the section 7 consultation procedure to apply only to "discretionary action" federal agencies take under their
respective authorizing statutes."' The action-taking statute in question, the
Clean Water Act ("CWA")," 9 requires the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") to delegate authority to issue water pollution permits
(known as National Pollution Discharge Elimination System Permits or
"NPDES permits") to a state once the state satisfies nine prescribed criteria,
such as adequacy of enforcement authority.12 0 Environmental groups argued,
and the Ninth Circuit agreed, that EPA improperly delegated this authority to
Arizona because, consistent with the FWS and NMFS rule, EPA did not also
consult with the FWS and NMFS under section 7(a)(2) of the ESA to ensure
that the delegation to Arizona would not jeopardize a protected species.121
The issues for the Court thus were whether the agencies' rule limiting section
7 consultation to discretionary agency actions was a valid interpretation of
the statute and, if so, whether the CWA delegation procedure allowed EPA
any discretion.
Justice Alito based his decision for the majority reversing the decision
below on the finding that the CWA makes delegation of permitting authority
non-discretionary once the nine criteria are met,122 whereas section 7(a)(2) of
the ESA, as reasonably interpreted by FWS and NMFS in his view, requires
consultation only with respect to discretionary agency actions.' 23 Given this
reading of the statutes, and that the later-enacted ESA does not expressly
intervene in the CWA delegation process, the majority found no basis for
finding an express or implied repeal of the CWA and refused to apply the
urged "tenth criterion" in the form of a requirement that the delegation undergo a satisfactory section 7 consultation.124
Notably, Justice Stevens, in his opinion for the four dissenting Justices,
attacked the majority opinion as an outright repudiation of "our unequivocal
holding in Hill that the ESA has 'first priority' over all other federal action." 25 He leaned on Hill's "admits of no exception" principle to reason
" 551 U.S. 644 (2007).
"' See id. at 664-69. Justice Alito wrote the majority opinion in which Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas joined. Justices Stevens, Breyer, Ginsberg,
and Souter dissented. Id. at 648.
119 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006).
20
' See 551 U.S. at 650-51.
121 See id. at 655.
Justice Stevens in dissent disagreed with the majority's characterization of the CWA
delegation action as nondiscretionary, see id. at 690-93, but that question is outside the scope
of this Article.
12

See id. at 661-73.

125

Id. at 678 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

124 Id.

at 663.
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that "it follows from Hill that § 7(a)(2) applies to such NPDES transfers whether they are mandatory or discretionary."l 26 In his view, the majority's
approach thus "permits a wholesale limitation on the reach of the ESA. Its
interpretation of [the agency rule] conflicts with ... our interpretation of § 7
in the 'snail darter' case." 27
Indeed, the majority's rationale in Home Builders more closely resembles Justice Powell's dissent in Hill than anything in Chief Justice Burger's
majority opinion. Similarly, as Justice Powell explained his reasoning in
Hill

The critical word in § 7 is "actions" and its meaning is far from
"plain." It is part of the phrase: "actions authorized, funded or
carried out." In terms of planning and executing various activities, it seems evident that the "actions" referred to are not all actions that an agency can ever take, but rather actions that the
agency is deciding whether to authorize, to fund, or to carry out.' 28
Similarly, the Home Builders majority deferred to the agencies' rule
providing that "§ 7(a)(2)'s no-jeopardy duty covers only discretionary
agency actions and does not attach to actions (like the NPDES permitting
transfer authorization) that an agency is required by statute to undertake
once certain specified triggering events have occurred." 29 The majority
then distinguished Hill on the basis that "[c]entral to the Court's decision
was the conclusion that Congress did not mandate that the TVA put the dam
into operation; there was no statutory command to that effect .. . ."'o Hill
thus "did not speak to the question whether § 7(a)(2) applies to non-discretionary actions . . . ."3
To be sure, Home Builders leaves Hill breathing. By limiting the analysis of how much discretion the agency enjoys to the de jure question of what
the statute provides, the majority did not buy into the full effect of Justice
Powell's dissent in Hill, which characterized the dam as de facto nondiscretionary on the basis of its nearly completed construction. But Home Builders surely narrows Hill's scope by putting nondiscretionary actions off-limits
for the ESA and, more fundamentally, by reversing the presumption of statutory priority.' 32 In Hill the Court searched for but could not find congressional displacement of section 7 of the ESA in any of the TVA legislation i.e., the ESA trumps unless there is clear congressional intent to preempt it.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 679 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
' TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 205 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting).
129 551 U.S. at 669.
30
126
127

28

1

Id. at 670.

Id. at 671.
See Doug Karpa, Loose Canons: The Supreme Court Guns for the Endangered Species
Act in National Association of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 291,
293 (2008) (arguing that Home Builders "worked a substantial revision of United States environmental policy that limits the reach of the [ESA] and renders biodiversity policy incoherent
and self-defeating").
''

132

HeinOnline -- 36 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 506 2012

2012]

Ruhl, The ESA's Fall from Grace

507

In Home Builders the Court switches perspectives, ruling that the ESA does
not implicitly repeal another affirmative congressional directive - i.e., the
other statute trumps unless there is clear congressional intent for the ESA to
preempt it.
Justice Stevens no doubt sensed that Home Builders was about far more
than the narrow questions certified - it was about whether Hill's "definitive
interpretation" of the ESAl33 had any lasting potency to tilt the balance of
legal interpretation in favor of the ESA's central goal of species protection.
Apparently, it does not in the Supreme Court any longer. Hill may still be
breathing after Home Builders, but it is on life support.
To be sure, the distance one believes Hill has fallen after Home Builders depends to some extent on how one believes the five cases fit together.
As noted previously, one could characterize all five of the cases as more
about statutory interpretation and standing doctrines than about the ESA, in
which case asking how far Hill has fallen is a non sequitur. But that does
not respond to the point that these five cases are indeed the sum total of the
Court's pronouncements on one of the nation's premier environmental statutes. If these cases cannot give us some glimpse into the Court's ESA mind,
none can.
More to that point, however, Hill could plausibly be interpreted as a
one-off instance of the Court coming to the environment's rescue. After all,
it is the only one of the five ESA cases that involved active application of
the ESA for the protection of a species thought to be on the brink of extinction; the other four cases involved general principles of statutory interpretation and standing doctrine with no direct consequences to species on the line.
Perhaps the Hill majority simply decided to save the fish, and its statutory
interpretation thus should be taken as purely results-oriented, leaving the
Court since then to mop up after Chief Justice Burger's unnecessarily generous opinion. From this perspective Hill has not really fallen because the
Court never really intended for it to have any meaning outside of its particular circumstances. But Justice Stevens, the one Justice to have voted in all
five of the ESA cases, surely saw it differently in Home Builders. His view
is that Hill has fallen off a steep cliff, and he is not subtle about his charge
that the Court's ESA jurisprudence has been fundamentally altered.13 4 To
test his position, the next section explores in more detail how the Court and
the individual Justices have treated the ESA over time in the context of the
various interests involved in the cases.
C. The Justices

Legal scholars agree that environmental interests generally have not
fared well in the Court's jurisprudence, and have examined six possible ex-

'3 551 U.S. at 694 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
134 Id. at 678-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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planatory factors for the Court's behavior:'3 " (1) indifference to environmental values as a legal context (the Apathy Thesis); (2) ignorance about the
importance of the environment (the Ignorance Thesis); (3) bias against environmentalism (the Hostility Thesis); (4) bias in favor of the government
(the Pro-Government Thesis); (5) bias in favor of business interests (the ProBusiness Thesis); and (6) skepticism about environmental law (the Environmental Law Skepticism Thesis).' 36 These studies vary in terms of time
frame, variables examined, and use of empirical analysis.' 37 The first three
factors all have to do with the Court's perceptions of the environment and
environmental values (taken up in Part II of the Article), whereas the last
three factors all relate to the Court's perceptions of environmental law and its
institutional and economic impacts (taken up in Part III of the Article).
My study of the ESA in the Court, relying as it does on only five cases
and involving only one statute, clearly is too small and narrow a sample to
support conclusive findings about which of these variables help explain the
Court's overall environmental jurisprudence. This study differs from the
others, however, by tracing the arc of one of the core environmental laws
over its history in the Court spanning more than three decades. The ESA
thus can serve as a case study for illuminating and evaluating scholarly analyses of the Court, the environment, and environmental law.
To facilitate that purpose in later parts of this Article, the discussion in
this section focuses on the three competing interests at play in the cases environment, government, and business - to provide a brief descriptive account of how the decisions break down and the Justices stack up. Taking the
decisions first, Table 1 shows how the interests fared as well as the breakdown of the Justices in majority and concurring positions versus those dissenting. The first two rows show the interest of the party prevailing in the
court below and the disposition of the case in the Court. The next two rows
show the interest of the party prevailing in the Court and also the interest, if
any, incidentally benefitting from the decision. Because the government's
interest as a party could be aligned with either environmental or business
interests, it is important to show these aligned interests in each case. Indeed,
because environmental and business interests never coincided in the cases,
aligned interests only appear when linked to the government as a party. The
next two rows show the same for the losing interests - which interest was
the losing party and, if it was the government, which interest was aligned to
it. The final two rows show how the Justices voted, merging the majority

'" Of the legal scholars examining these possible explanations, Professor Stephen Johnson's work goes the farthest in developing a typology encompassing most of the factors listed
here and using it to compare different scholars' explanations for the Court's behavior. See
generally Johnson, supra note 21.
' I discuss each of these theses in more detail infra Parts II-III, treating the Pro-Government Thesis and Pro-Business Thesis together given their relatedness.
1" Compare Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental, supra note 21 (describing an empirical study examining over two hundred environmental decisions from 1969 to 1999), with
Lin, supra note 21 (studying only the 2003-404 term).
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and concurring Justices together as any nuanced differences are not vital for
these purposes and are addressed later in the Article where relevant.
TABLE

1.

INTERESTS AND OUTCOMES IN THE COURT'S

ESA

CASES

Table 1 thus reveals how much of an outlier Hill is in the ESA's overall
history in the Court. It is the only instance in which the environmental interest prevailed as a party, the only case in which the government and business
interests were aligned on the losing side, and the only instance in which the
Court affirmed the lower court decision. It was, in short, a home run for the
environment.
Table I also shows the ascendancy of business interests over the run of
cases. After Hill, where business interests were aligned with the government's loss, the only setback business interests have suffered was in Sweet
138 As explained supra note 72, Justice Stevens ruled for the government on substantive
grounds but would have held for the plaintiffs on the standing question.
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Home. That case, as described above, offered business interests a silver lining in the form of the tort law approach the Court took to causation in the

proof of harm analysis. Adjusting for that feature of Sweet Home - calling
it more of a tie than a loss for business in practical effect - business interests are undefeated since Hill.
Turning to the Justices, ordered by when they left the Court or joined it
if still sitting, Table 2 shows how each Justice who voted in one or more of
the ESA cases lined up with respect to environmental, government, and business interests. Whichever interest the Justice voted for, whether in the majority, concurrence, or dissent, the vote is counted in the "Primary" column
under the appropriate "Pro" interest category. In addition to accounting for
votes for the prevailing or losing party's interest, Table 2 also accounts for
aligned interests that benefitted, or would have benefitted in the case of a
dissenting vote, from a vote for the government interest. For example, if a
Justice voted for the government and the government prevailed, that vote is
counted in the "Primary" column under "Pro-Government," and if business
interests were aligned with the government in the case, the Justice also
would be counted under the "Aligned" column under "Pro-Business."
This tabulation reveals several trends. First, the government is the
dominant primary vote recipient. Since Hill it has garnered as many primary
votes as environmental and business interests combined and more than them
combined when counting only Justices still sitting. Even more telling, however, is how the balance tilts when all primary and aligned interests are considered. Since Hill, business interests have received more than double the
primary and aligned votes that environmental interests have received. Of the
thirteen Justices who have cast a vote in an ESA case since Hill, five never
cast a primary or aligned vote for the environment, and three did so only
once. Of the seven of those Justices still sitting, primary votes for government and business interests combined outnumber primary votes for the environment eighteen to two, and aligned votes for business interests outnumber
aligned votes for environmental interests eight to three. Once again, these
scores count Sweet Home as an aligned victory for environmental interests,
when in fact business interests may think of it as a partial victory as well. If
Sweet Home is considered a tie, therefore, business interests truly swamp
environmental interests.
Based on the foregoing descriptions of the statute, the cases, and the
Justices' voting records, the discussion turns in the remaining parts of this
Article to the lessons that can be drawn. No further proof or analysis is
needed to conclude that Hill has been neutered and, consequently, the ESA
diminished as a force in environmental law. The "at all costs" and "top
priority" themes of Hill are over and done with in the Court after Home
Builders. But what does that fall from grace tell us about the status of environmental values and environmental law in the Court's jurisprudence, and
what does it tell us about design principles for environmental law if avoiding
similar demises is of any concern?
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Justice

2.

VOTING PATTERNS OF THE JUSTICES IN

ESA

CASES

ProProProNumber
of
Environment Government Business
Cases
Primary
Aligned
Primary Primary Aligned

Stewart

1

1

Burger

1

1

Powell

1

Brennan

1

1

Marshall

1

1

White

2

Blackmun

2

Rehnquist

4

O'Connor

3

1

Souter

4

1

Stevens

5

2

1

2

1

1

2

2

2

3

1

2
2

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

2

1

1

1

1

2

1

Scalia

4

Kennedy

4

Thomas

4

2

2

Ginsburg

3

1

1

1

1

Breyer

3

1

1

1

1

1

2
1

Roberts

1

1

1

Alito

1

1

1

12

6

21

12

15

Total - post-Hill

6

6

18

12

12

Total - still sitting

2

3

11

7

8

Total - all

II. THE COURT

AND ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES

What does the Supreme Court think of the environment and environmentalism? Not much, suggests the foregoing case study of the ESA in the
Court. But by "not much" one could intend several different meanings.
One is that the Court simply does not think much about the environment in
selecting and deciding cases. In this view, other factors, such as the integrity
of administrative law or proper statutory interpretation techniques, and not
species protection, are what have driven the Court's ESA decisions. The
Court is, in other words, apathetic about the environment and it is simply a
coincidence that any case involves the environment as context for a more
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central issue of concern, such as standing. Another meaning could be that
the Court, while thinking purposively about the environment, has not formed
an accurate conception of it. In this view, the Court might have an environmental purpose when it selects and decides cases involving the environment
- perhaps even a benevolent one - but is misguided by its environmental
ignorance in how best to fulfill those purposes. Lastly, the Court might simply not think much of the environment. In this view, hostility to environmentalism guides the Court's case selections and decisions. Legal scholars
have posited all three of these "not much" explanations for what the Court
thinks of environmentalism, and the history of the ESA in the Court lends
support to all three interpretations.
A.

The Apathy Thesis

Professor Dan Farber has suggested that the Court has rendered itself
irrelevant to environmental law through a long practice of "hyperactive passivity" about the environment and environmental law.13 9 Whether the Justices are emotionally apathetic about the environment is hard to prove one
way or the other, but if any Justice has been particularly interested in the
environment as a jurisprudential context it is hard to detect from the five
ESA opinions. Three of the cases were hotly contested decisions involving
substantive interpretation of the statute, yet at most one can detect only occasional nods to the environment as a factor in the tussle. Hill, not surprisingly, has the most to say about the environment. For example, Chief Justice
Burger's selections from the legislative history often focus on the virtues of
species conservation. One extended quote waxes about the importance of
mollusks,140 and elsewhere the opinion emphasizes that "the legislative proceedings in 1973 are, in fact, replete with expressions of concern over the
risk that might lie in the loss of any endangered species."'41 Chief Justice
Burger then adds numerous italicized emphases in a long quote on genetic
heritage, the final suggesting his endorsement of the ESA as an "institutionalization of .

.

. caution."

42

Similarly, Sweet Home, the only other decision in which environmental
interests ostensibly came out on top (though as an aligned interest and arguably not decisively), also contains a few examples of the Justices having
thought about the environmental consequences of the contrasting interpretations. In disputing Justice Scalia's conception of harm, for example, it was
important to the majority that under his interpretation "a developer could
drain a pond, knowing that the act would extinguish an endangered species
of turtles." 43 Similarly, Justice O'Connor's concurrence emphasized that
'3 See Farber, supra note 21, at 549; Manaster, supra note 21, at 1963-66.
1
TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 177 n.23 (1978).
141
42 Id. at 177.
1

143

Id. at 178-79.

Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 701 n.15

(1995).

HeinOnline -- 36 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 512 2012

2012]

Ruhl, The ESA's Fallfrom Grace

513

"breeding, feeding, and sheltering are what animals do," so if a land use
interferes with any of those essential behaviors it could run the risk of causing actual death or injury prohibited under section 9.144
By and large, however, one has to look hard and stretch a bit to find
these and the few other isolated examples of any Justice inserting the environment directly into the jurisprudence of the ESA. After Hill they are almost nonexistent. Even the dissenting opinions in Lujan and Home Builders
fail to capitalize on any sense that the environment is at stake in the case.
The Lujan dissents are remarkably sterile in this sense, not mentioning Hill
or anything about the environment. Similarly, while Justice Stevens invokes
Hill in his Home Builders dissent, only at the end of his opinion does he go
beyond complaining about the majority's statutory interpretation and infidelity to Hill, claiming without the slightest bit of elaboration that the majority's
approach "places a great number of endangered species in jeopardy."14 In
short, the Court's ESA cases and the Justices' opinions have much to say
about the ESA, but not much to say about the importance of species
conservation.
B.

The Ignorance Thesis

While not going so far as to call the Court environmentally ignorant,
Richard Lazarus has suggested that part of the explanation for how the Court
has approached the environment stems from its lack of sufficient experiential grounding in ecology.146 Lack of a deep understanding of ecological
processes could help explain the Court's growing distance from the ESA, as
the ESA is inherently about how ecosystems support species and how injuries to ecosystem integrity undermine that support.
The ignorance thesis finds support in several of the Court's ESA cases.
Ironically, one of the most glaring examples is from the majority opinion in
Hill, where Chief Justice Burger wrote that "[u]ntil recently the finding of a
new species of animal life would hardly generate a cause celebre."l 47 Biologists might beg to differ. Perhaps lawyers only began to care about the finding of new species once the ESA made that a legally relevant event, but
biologists did not require the ESA to put the discovery of new species high
on their list. Consider also the Sweet Home majority's arguably unbiological
tort law approach for determining whether a land use harms a species. As
Professor Patrick Parenteau has observed, "[c]onventional notions of proximate cause do not mesh well with the way that the science of conservation
biology evaluates the risk of extinction from multiple factors including

at 710 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Nat'1 Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 694 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
146See Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental, supra note 21, at 744-71.
'4 437 U.S. at 159.
14Id.

1s
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habitat loss and fragmentation."1 48 In other words, conservation biologists
do not think like tort lawyers.
Of course, any disconnect between the science of species conservation
and the law of species conservation is not the Court's doing - it is the
product of an underlying tension in the ESA between science and law. The
statute compels a messy amalgam of scientific and legal determinations,
such as whether a land use is the proximate cause of harm to a species, from
which a "law-science" decision-making process emerges, befuddling to lawyers and scientists alike. 14 9 The Sweet Home Court thus was in a bind, for
had it crafted a scientific standard for harm, the lawyers would have accused
the Court of legal ignorance. Perhaps, therefore, the ESA cases demonstrate
that the Court's exhibited ignorance of the environment in its ESA cases is a
function not of the Justices' own lack of diligence, but of the challenges of
environmental law in general.
C. The Hostility Thesis
Some scholars have characterized the Court, particularly members of
the Roberts Court, as practicing "anti-environmental activism."5 0 While
one can identify isolated examples in the Court's ESA cases supporting the
apathy thesis and the ignorance thesis, the hostility thesis finds support running throughout. Justice Powell's dissent in Hill started the theme, to say the
least. The opinion chokes out an obligatory bow to the environment buried
in a footnote, where he claims that "[t]he purpose of this Act is admirable"
and that "[p]rotection of endangered species long has been neglected," but
immediately thereafter suggests that the majority's decision was "invited by
careless draftsmanship of otherwise meritorious legislation.""' The body of
the opinion is reserved for the real salvos at the environment, including his
remark that the majority's opinion lacks "accord[ ] with some modicum of
common sense and the public weal." 52 He went so far as to accuse the
majority's interpretation of the ESA of being "without regard to its manifest
148 Parenteau, supra note 40, at 154; see also BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 1, at 215-16
(describing how "this issue of the directness of the linkage between the habitat destruction and
the resulting injury or death of an endangered animal . . . confused the Court" and observing
that "a biologist may view the death of a turtle from draining its pond as a highly likely and
predictable result, yet the turtle's death may be entirely unforeseen by the ordinary person with
no biology training"). As Professor Robert Adler has argued, Justice Scalia's dissent in Sweet
Home evidences an even greater disconnect between scientific and the Court's understanding
of ecosystems. See Robert W. Adler, The Supreme Court and Ecosystems: Environmental
Science in Environmental Law, 27 VT. L. REV. 249, 362 (2003) ("Justice Scalia appeared to
believe, contrary to the basic tenets of modern conservation biology, that species can only be
protected within confined zoological reserves . . . .").
149 See J.B. Ruhl, Reconstructing the Wall of Virtue: Maxims for the Co-evolution of Environmental Law and Environmental Science, 37 ENvrL. L. 1063, 1068-76 (2007) (describing
the numerous law-science decisions demanded under the ESA).
ISOManus, supra note 21, at 221; see Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental, supra
note 21, at 705; Lin, supra note 21, at 632-35.
'' 437 U.S. at 202 n. 11 (Powell, J., dissenting).
152 Id. at 196 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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purpose,"' 5 3 as if stopping the dam worked counter to the interest of the snail
darter, and to reveal that he could "not believe that Congress would have
gone this far to imperil every federal project, however important, on behalf
of any living species however unimportant."l 54
Far subtler in its antagonism for the environment is Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion. As noted above, in some passages he appears
blithely ignorant about the importance of such events as discovery of new
species. His perspective elsewhere in the opinion, however, has been described as anything from "studied ambivalence" to adopting an openly
"skeptical tone.""' For example, the opinion describes it as "curious to
some that the survival of a relatively small number of three-inch fish among
all the countless millions of species extant" would require shutting down the
dam project.'^ Hemmed in by the text of the statute, but by no means committed to the purpose of the statute, by the end of the opinion Justice Burger
appears to be begging Congress to correct the "unwisdom" of the ESA.'5 7 If
the overall tenor of the opinion cannot be deemed hostile to species conservation, neither can it be deemed the least bit enthusiastic.
Moving into the modem era of the Court's ESA cases, Justice Scalia's
majority opinion in Lujan continues the tradition by smoothly denigrating
the interests in the environment the plaintiffs advanced as, in Justice Scalia's
words, a "series of novel standing theories.""' Although not openly hostile
to the idea that the environment deserves protection, the opinion drips with
disdain as Justice Scalia, writing in the textualist tradition, dissects what he
calls the "inelegantly styled 'ecosystem nexus"' and its siblings "called,
alas, the 'animal nexus' approach . . . and the 'vocational nexus' approach."' 59 These are so far off the mark, according to Justice Scalia, as to
comprise "pure speculation and fantasy." 6 0
Justice Scalia was far less restrained in dissent in Sweet Home, where
his concerns centered on the impact that the majority's decision to uphold the
harm regulation could have on private land uses and industry. Although
once again framing his decision as textalist purism, Justice Scalia's true colors do shine through here and there, as when he complains that under the
majority's decision "[a] large number of routine private actions - for example, farming, roadbuilding, construction and logging - are subjected to
strict-liability penalties when they fortuitously injure protected wildlife." 6 '
The opinion also reveals Justice Scalia's concern over the distribution of the
benefits and burdens of fulfilling environmental values, as in his interpreta15

154

15s
16

Id. at 202 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 207 n.16 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
See Cannon, supra note 15, at 416.
437 U.S. at 172.

1'7 Id. at 194.
158Lujan v. Defenders
'9 Id. at 565-66.
0
6 Id. at 567.

of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 565 (1992).

161 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 721 (1995)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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tion that the ESA requires "habitat destruction on private lands ... to be
particular unlucky landremedied by public acquisition, and not by making
62
owners incur 'excessive costs to themselves."
This concern over the impacts of the ESA on private interests comes
through in Bennett as well, where, writing for the unanimous Court, Justice
Scalia emphasized that the ranchers' need for water is a "competing interest
in the water the Biological Opinion declares necessary for the preservation
of the suckers."' 63 This "competing interest" is put on equal footing with
species conservation for purposes of standing under the ESA's citizen suit
provision because, as Justice Scalia observes, "there is no textual basis for
saying its expansion of standing requirements applies to environmentalists
alone."'1 Similarly, under the APA standing analysis, Justice Scalia places
the "ESA's overall goal of species preservation" on no higher ground than
the interest in "avoid[ing] needless economic dislocation."' 65 The message
is clear: environmental interests might needlessly conflict with economic interests, so both get a say under the ESA.
Ironically, the one opinion devoid of textual evidence of hostility to the
environment is the one Justice Stevens accuses of "plac[ing] a great number
of endangered species in jeopardy." 66 One will search Justice Alito's sterile,
descriptive Home Builders opinion in vain for even the slightest hit on the
environment. Perhaps that says it all - it is no longer necessary to take
swipes at species conservation to justify taking the ESA down yet a few
more pegs.
III.

THE COURT AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

Although one can extract excerpts from the Court's ESA cases to support any of the three theses about the Court's environmental values attitude,
none of the theses seem entirely satisfying as a medium for understanding
and explaining the decline of Hill and the ESA in the Court's jurisprudence.
After all, if a majority of the Court truly has held and still holds substantial
hostility toward the environment, how did Hill happen, and why did it take
three decades to undo? Yet the apathy and ignorance theses also offer incomplete explanations, as the trend in the cases has been unmistakably toward taking more punch out of the ESA each step of the way. Apathy and
ignorance are unlikely sources of such consistency.
Hence, although apathy, ignorance, and hostility toward the environment may all be in the mix to some extent for various Justices over time, it is
62 Id. at 728 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 735-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating
that the ESA "places on the public at large, rather than on fortuitously accountable individual

landowners, the cost of preserving the habitat of endangered species").
163Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 160 (1997).
6 Id. at 166.
65
1 Id. at 176.

" Nat'1 Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 694 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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necessary to step out of the texts of the cases and the names of the Justices to
get a fuller sense of what is behind the ESA's fall from grace. This leads us
to an important historical period not yet examined - the gap from Hill to
Lujan. Hill caught the ESA in its relative infancy, just five years after enactment, whereas Lujan, fifteen years after Hill, worked with a statute in full
swing. What happened in between?
To be sure, the composition of the Court changed in the interim, but as
previously noted, not obviously in a way as devastating to Hill as matters
have turned out.' 67 In any event, the Court took no occasion to affirm or
reject Hill's message during the following decade and a half - the ESA was
offline for the Court during that period.
By comparison, Congress remained more engaged, reacting quickly to
Hill by adding the symbolic "God Squad" exemption to the statute in
1978168 and making a number of minor and more substantial adjustments to
the statute in several other rounds of amendments.169 Congress shut down
further meaningful work on the ESA in 1982, however, and at that time the
statute was still very close to its original formO - close enough at least to
rule out changes in the statute as a factor for the Court's reversal of
sentiment.
By contrast, whereas the Court and, soon after, Congress went on ESA
hiatus, beginning in the 1990s the FWS and NMFS initiated a breathtakingly
expansive agenda of administrative reform of the ESA's regulatory programs. As this Part explains, the transformational effects of the agencies'
reform efforts correlate most closely with the Court's turnabout on the ESA.
My argument, ir other words, is that since it got back in the ESA game, the
Court has not been troubled by species conservation generally so much as it
has been troubled by how the agencies implement species conservation, as
well as by who has been most adversely affected - business interests.
A.

The Environmental Law Skepticism Thesis

The argument that ESA's implementation, rather than its purposes, lies
behind its downfall in the Court is consistent with the central thesis Professor Lazarus has developed in his work on the Court in the environmental
realm: it is environmental law, not necessarily environmental values, that
has been the principal target of the Court's skepticism over the past four
167 See

supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)-(n). Known officially as the Endangered Species Committee
exemption, Congress designed this cumbersome and infrequently used exemption procedure to
allow a federal project to go forward notwithstanding that it might jeopardize a species.
86 These amendments are explained in STANFORD ENvTL. LAW Soc'Y, supra note 1, at
22-26. Amendments in 1979 and 1988 were technical and of no substantive consequence.
See also U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., A HISTORY OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES AcT (2001),
available at http://www.fws.gov/endangeredlesa-library/pdflhistory-ESA.pdf (summarizing
each round of amendments).
' See STANFORD ENvTL. LAW Soc'Y, supra note 1, at 22-26.
16'
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decades."' Indeed, the ESA's fate in the Court offers compelling evidence
of this thesis, as the ESA evolved from a values statute to a legalistic regulatory regime in the time between Hill and its hostile successors.
The ESA started out as an outlier among environmental laws. Compared to the major pollution control laws enacted in the early 1970s, the
Clean Air Act ("CAA")172 and CWA, the ESA seemed an oddity. As Professor Zygmunt Plater has explained in discussing the features contributing
to the statute's "differentness," the ESA imposed no regulatory prohibitions
of any obvious command-and-control scope and weight, did not employ a
cooperative federalism structure to enlist state involvement, erected no extensive enforcement mechanisms, had no statutorily defined geographic domain, and was drafted in generalized policy terms, not detailed regulatory
script."' This led to implementation largely through litigation that was, like
Hill, "typically citizen-promoted and opportunistic, most often focusing attention on . . . just one highly localized habitat place - one creek, one
spring, one cave, one valley." 7 4 Of course, Hill made it clear that even "one
creek" could be significant both politically and economically, but it did not
provide much of a glimpse into the future of ESA implementation.
A convergence of several trends completely transformed the "one
creek" ESA of the Hill days into a statute of immense regulatory power and
geographic reach. First, largely as a result of citizen petitions, the number of
listed species in the United States rose from about 200 in 1975 to just under
1000 in 1995, and geographic coverage of their aggregate critical habitat
designations necessarily went nationwide as well."' The effect was to expand the ESA's reach far throughout the nation as the "one creek" feature
multiplied to such an extent that there was a potential "one creek" problem
around every corner.' 76 And some of these "one creeks" became as large as
states, or even larger, as species with vast geographic ranges, such as the
northern spotted owl and Pacific salmon, were listed.'77 Moreover, the
proliferation of federal environmental laws during the 1970s meant that pri"' See generally Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental, supra note 21.
17242 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2006).
'7 Plater, supra note 15, at 290-91.
74
'
Id. at 291.
1s See D. Noah Greenwald et al., The Listing Record, in THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
AT THIRTY, supra note 1, at 51, 55 (charting annual listings from citizen petitions); Scott et al.,
supra note 45, at 17 (charting annual and cumulative listings); id. at 24 (depicting a map of
critical habitat distribution).
76 See Scott et al., supra note 45, at 21 (showing a 2004 map of U.S. distribution of listed
species). For an interactive map showing the listed species found in every state and county,
see Species Search, U.S. FisH & WILDLIFE SERV., http://www.fws.gov/endangered/species/index.html (last updated Apr. 23, 2012).
"' See State Maps Showing Sub-Units, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., http://www.fws.gov/
pacific/ecoservices/nso/map.html (last visited May 18, 2012) (on file with the Harvard Law
School Library) (mapping the vast geographic scope of northern spotted owl critical habitat);
Salmon Critical Habitat Designation Maps, Nw. REGL OFFICE, NATL MARINE FISHERIES
SERV., http://www.nwr.noaa.gov/Salmon-Habitat/Critical-Habitat/CH-maps.cfm (last visited
May 18, 2012) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (containing maps showing the
vast geographic scope of salmon population critical habitat).
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vate land development and resource use projects increasingly required federal environmental permits, which trigger the "authorized by" action agency
nexus under section 7,178 meaning section 7 increasingly reached deeper and
deeper into the private sector.179 Simultaneously, citizen suit litigation exploded through aggressive litigation against federal agencies under section 7
and prosecutions under the section 9 take prohibition, often using the harm
definition to attack land uses involving loss of species habitat.s 0 The net
result was that by the early 1990s, the ESA was about far more than stopping
a federal project here and there - the "one creek" had gone viral, the ESA
had gone nationwide, and the regulatory burden had gone private. The ESA,
in other words, was now acting like a mainstream environmental law.
And thus Congress awakened. The congressional politics of the mid1990s placed the now-expansive ESA problem front and center in the congressional reform agenda. Seeing the writing on the wall, Secretary of the
Interior Bruce Babbitt set in motion an administrative reform agenda that
successfully staved off the congressional assault, but which would forever
transform the ESA.1'1 Chief among these reforms was the reinvention of a
previously little-used permitting program found in section 10(a) of the statute, known colloquially as the habitat conservation plan ("HCP") program.18 2 Put simply, an HCP permit provides an avenue for non-federal
projects not subject to section 7 to obtain authorization to take a protected
species, usually in the form of habitat modification, in return for mitigation

'7 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006) (requiring consultation for actions federal agencies
authorize).
17 As one court recently observed in connection with the regulatory scope of section 7, "a
vast number of land use projects require a permit from a federal agency," so if a parcel of land
is part of a critical habitat designation, "it may become quite difficult for a public or private
entity to exploit that land." Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 2011
WL 73494, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2011); see generally Patrick W. Ryan & Erika E. Malmen,

Interagency Consultation Under Section 7, in LAW,

POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES,

supra note 1,

at 104, 106 ("Whenever a nonfederal entity seeks a license or permit to proceed with a project
or activity, compliance with section 7(a)(2) is almost always implicated.").
ISO
See Glen & Douglas, supra note 40 (discussing the history of citizen suits enforcing
section 9); Eric R. Glitzenstein, supra note 46, at 260, 276 ("Citizen suits have been crucial to
the enforcement of the ESA and they will continue to play a vital role in the Act's implementation regardless of who controls the political branches of government.").
'8' For a detailed contemporaneous review of the reform agenda items and implementation, see J.B. Ruhl, Who Needs Congress? An Agenda for Administrative Reform of the Endangered Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 367, 374-87 (1998).
182 See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B). For policy discussions of the HCP program written
when it was emerging from dormancy under Secretary Babbitt's visionary reform agenda, see

Robert D. Thornton, Searching for Consensus and Predictability:Habitat Conservation Planning under the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 21 ENvrT. L. 605 (1991); J. B. Ruhl, Regional Habitat Conservation Planning under the Endangered Species Act: Pushing the Legal
and PracticalLimits of Species Protection, 44 Sw. L.J. 1393 (1991). For policy discussions

having the benefit of several years of experience of program implementation, see DEFENDERS
OF WILDLIFE, FRAYED SAFETY NETS (1998); Albert C. Lin, Participants'Experiences with
Habitat Conservation Plans and Suggestions for Streamlining the Process, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q.
369 (1996); Eric Fisher, Habitat Conservation Planning Under the Endangered Species Act:
No Surprises & the Quest for Certainty, 67 U. COLo. L. REv. 371 (1996).
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and other measures assembled in a conservation plan.' 83 Although the HCP
program was added to the statute in the 1982 amendments, it had been essentially dormant throughout the 1980s.184 Secretary Babbitt saw it as a winwin reform opportunity, however, as he could offer landowners a palatable
and secure way out of their ESA problems - give the species some conserved habitat as mitigation for the modified habitat and you get to use your
property. 85
The rejuvenated HCP program was a huge success, with hundreds of
permits issued by FWS throughout the nation in just a few years."8 Indeed,
through the use of "regional" HCPs large metropolitan areas and even states
could solve their ESA problems through megapermits, some covering up to
hundreds of thousands of acres, thus giving the program the "cooperative
federalism" feel of the pollution control laws.' Overall, these developments went a long way toward allaying the property rights pushback against
the ESA,'88 but that gain came at a cost to the ESA's image. HCPs gave the
ESA the look of any other environmental law - a command-and-control
program that enlisted state and local cooperation through large-scale permits, leveraged the harm definition to extend jurisdiction over private property widely throughout the nation, and administered a heavy regulatory
permitting process to control how land uses comply.' Suddenly the ESA
started to look more like the other environmental protection statutes. Not
coincidently, that is when its troubles began in the Court.
83 For a more detailed description of the HCP permitting process, see J.B. Ruhl, supra
note 96, at 376-96.
84 By 1992, for example, FWS had issued only twelve HCP permits. DEFENDERS OF
WILDLIFE, supra note 182, at vi-xiii.
'5 For comprehensive and thoughtful "insider" accounts of Secretary Babbitt's vision and
implementation of this phase of ESA reform, see John D. Leshy, The Babbitt Legacy at the
Department of Interior: A Preliminary View, 31 ENvT. L. 199 (2001); Joseph L. Sax, Environmental Law at the Turn of the Century; A Reportorial Fragment of Contemporary History,
88 CAL. L. REV. 2375 (2000). For a brief history of the ramping up of the HCP program
specifically, see Robert D. Thornton, HabitatConservation Plans: FrayedSafety Nets or Creative Partnerships?,16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENVr 94, 95 (2001).
16 By late 1997 FWS had issued more than 225 HCP permits. See DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, supra note 182 at vi-xiii.
"8 See Ruhl, supra note 182 (describing the regulatory leverage and permit administration
features of the HCP program). The ESA clearly does not replicate the formal cooperative
federalism structure of the CAA and CWA. See J.B. Ruhl, Cooperative Federalism and the
Endangered Species Act: A Comparative Assessment and Call for Change, in THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND FEDERALISM 35 (Kaush Arha & Barton H. Thompson, Jr. eds., 2011).
The large-scale HCP permitting thrust, however, brought state and local governments deeply
into the fold. See Robert P. Davison, The Evolution of Federalism under Section 6 of the
EndangeredSpecies Act, in THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND FEDERALISM, supra note 187,
at 89, 106-10.
188See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The EndangeredSpecies Act: A Case Study in Takings &
Incentives, 49 STAN. L. REV. 305, 315-24 (1997).
1' See Liebesman & Petersen, supra note 1, at 73 (describing the HCP permitting process
as a "regulatory hurdle[ ]" that "has proven to be demanding and resource-intensive");
Thornton, supra note 185, at 95 (describing the HCP program as becoming "increasingly complex and sophisticated" and plagued by "sheer complexity," the "absence of adequate public

funding," and "regulatory uncertainty").
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The first post-Hill blow, Lujan, preceded the rise of the HCPs, but it
caught the ESA well on its way to ever-expanding geographic reach through
section 7. By approaching the case as a standing problem, the Court avoided
having to reach the extraterritorial jurisdiction question, but by denying
standing the decision substantially restricted access to the courts even for
domestic "one creek" disputes. Still, Lujan did not engage the fully transformed ESA.
By contrast, Sweet Home concerned the lynchpin of the ESA's new
mainstream model - the harm definition and the regulatory leverage it provides for the ESA generally and the HCP program in particular. If the Court
had rejected the possibility of habitat modification constituting an illegal
take of protected species, accepting Justice Scalia's theory that direct force or
contact must cause the death or injury, the ESA would have largely evaporated as a non-federal lands regulatory statute.19 0 Only the section 7 jeopardy prohibition would have applied to non-federal lands, and even then
only through federal agency funding and approval actions. The HCP permitting program thus perfectly illustrated what the harm definition supported a sprawling environmental command-and-control statute. Justice Scalia
wanted nothing to do with that, working instead to turn the statute into a
hunting regulation regime. The majority did not accept Justice Scalia's
cramped interpretation of "harm," but rather treated the harm definition like
any other leg in a command-and-control regime - the enforcement agency
has to prove the violation, and that requires meeting some standard of causation, in this case one integrating tort principles of proximate cause.
Matters turned much uglier for the ESA in Bennett, where the unanimous Court treated the ESA as if it were just any other command-and-control environmental statute. No passage in any opinion involving any
environmental statute could better reveal the Court's skepticism about environmental law generally than its concern that the ESA must employ a "best
scientific data available" standard "to ensure that the ESA not be imple' Eighty-five percent of imperiled species included in one study were affected by habitat
loss, with private land conversion for commercial and residential uses being the leading contributor. See David S. Wilcove et al., Quantifying Threats to Imperiled Species in the United
States, 48 BIOSCIENCE 607, 609-12 (1998). Moreover, the prevalence of at-risk species on
nonfederal lands increases the importance of policies toward private land development. One
study estimates that over ninety percent of the species listed as threatened or endangered under
the ESA have some or all of their habitat on nonfederal lands. U.S. GEN. AccouNTING OFF.,
GAO/RCED-95-16, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: INFORMATION ON SPECIES PROTECTION ON
NONFEDERAL LANDS 4 (1994), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1995/rc95016.pdf. Of
those species, about seventy-three percent have over sixty percent of their habitat on
nonfederal lands, and about thirty-seven percent are completely dependent on nonfederal
lands. Id. at 5. Several studies demonstrate that a mere seven percent of the land area of the
United States is home to fully fifty percent of plant and animal species listed under the ESA,
and that the "hot spots," within which many at-risk species appear in clusters, are often located near areas experiencing suburban expansion. See Mapping Out EndangeredSpecies' Hot
Spots, 150 SC. NEWS 101 (1996); see also A.P. Dobson et al., Geographic Distribution of
EndangeredSpecies in the United States, 275 SCIENCE 550 (1997); Jon Paul Rodriguez et al.,
Where are EndangeredSpecies Found in the United States?, ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE,
Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 1.
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mented haphazardly, on the basis of speculation ... [and] to avoid needless
economic dislocation produced by agency officials zealously but unintelligently pursuing their environmental objectives." 9 ' That additional reminder
that the ranchers' water uses were "competing interests" on equal standing
grounds with species conservation interests'92 leaves little doubt that the
ESA enjoys no special status among environmental laws and that environmental laws enjoy no special status at all.
Indeed, the Home Builders decision appears to take pains to assign no
sense of importance to the ESA, treating its collision with the CWA as a
plain vanilla statutory interpretation problem to reconcile two equals in the
lowly class of environmental laws. Despite all the protestations by Justice
Stevens that the majority effectively abandoned Hill and subverted the
ESA's purposes, the majority's sterile, dispassionate opinion drives home the
lesson that the ESA is now a mere mortal among environmental laws. The
relevant statutory framework, however, had not changed materially since
Hill; it was through the expansion of listings, citizen suit litigation, the harm
definition, and the rise of the HCP programs that the ESA gradually
morphed from being different to being just like all the others. That, if anything, best explains the ESA's fall from grace into the Court's abyss of skepticism toward environmental law.
B.

The Pro-Business and Pro-Government Theses

A corollary to the thesis that the Court has reserved special skepticism
for environmental law, leading it to hammer away at the ESA as the FWS
and NMFS slowly took the statute into command-and-control mode, is the
thesis that the Court also generally seeks to protect business interests. 93 The
collateral damage of any such bias is likely to include skepticism about the
regulatory burdens of environmental law generally and the ESA specifically.
Under this view, the government more often wins when it is on the side of
business interests, and more often loses when it is against them. Professor
Jonathan Adler has challenged the pro-business thesis with a study of the
first two terms of the Roberts Court, contending that a pro-government bias
provides more explanatory value than the pro-business thesis because business interests reap incidental benefits when they have piggybacked on the
government's positions. 14
Longer-term studies of the Court point more strongly towards the probusiness thesis as the more robust of the two theories. For example, based
on their study of activism and restraint evident in the Court's environmental
opinions, Professors Levy and Glicksman conclude that "a consistent prodevelopment pattern has prevailed in the Supreme Court's environmental
"' Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 176-77 (1997).
92

1 Id. at 160, 179.

'9 See, e.g., Levy & Glicksman, supra note 21, passim.
" See Adler, supra note 21, at 972-75.
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law decisions since 1976."195 This pattern, they contend, has more explanatory value than the pro-government thesis, as a closer analysis of the Court's
treatment of the government in environmental cases shows that the government wins most consistently when it is aligned with business interests.' 96
Similarly, Professor Lazarus has observed that the Court "has been too willing to grant petitions filed by parties who claim that environmental protection laws are overreaching, which has led to an unfortunate skewing of the
Court's docket."1 97
The Court's ESA cases also seem to tilt more in favor of the pro-business thesis. As Tables 1 and 2 from Part I show, the government has lost in
two of the five ESA cases, Hill and Bennett. In two of the three cases in
which the government prevailed, Lujan and Home Builders, it was aligned
with business interests, and in Sweet Home, while it was aligned with environmental interests, the outcome as a practical matter has been favorable to
business interests. Indeed, Sweet Home is the only case in which business
interests have ostensibly been the losing party. If Sweet Home is the worst
the Court hands business interests under the ESA, that does not bode well
for environmental interests. .
The voting records behind those outcomes are even more lopsided. Of
the thirteen Justices who have cast a vote in at least one ESA case since Hill,
five never cast a primary or aligned vote for the environment, and three did
so only once. Of the seven of those Justices still sitting, primary votes for
business outnumber primary votes for the environment seven to two, and
aligned votes for business outnumber aligned votes for the environment
eight to three. Although the government wins the most cases and garners the
most primary votes, most of its sway with the Justices has come when it is
aligned with business.
By the time of Bennett, the Court was no longer hiding its pro-business
slant on the ESA. Central to the Court's standing analysis was its observation that "the overall subject matter of this legislation is the environment (a
matter in which it is common to think all persons have an interest)."1'9 The
ranchers and species conservation simply presented "competing interest[s]"
as to how to manage the environment,'" and in this respect it was as important to the Court to protect the ranchers from "overenforcement" as it was to
protect species from "underenforcement." 2 00 Particularly given that, in the
Court's estimation, such over-enforcement was likely to stem from "officials
zealously but unintelligently pursuing their environmental objectives" and
could lead to "needless economic dislocation," 20 1 business interests deserve

'

Levy & Glicksman, supra note 21, at 421.

' See
197

id. at 421-22.

Lazarus, The Nature of Environmental Law, supra note 21, at 9.
" Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 165 (1997).
99
Id. at 160.
2
0 Id. at 166.
201

Id. at 177.
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as much voice in the courts as do environmental interests. This hardly
sounds like pro-government rhetoric.
Bennett also proves an apt example of Professor Lazarus's observation
about the Court's petition review bias in favor of business interests challenging overreaching environmental laws. Indeed, that was apparently the purpose of the decision - to open the door to such challenges - and it has
clearly had that effect in ESA litigation.2 02 Home Builders, of course, is the
second shoe to drop in that regard, making it the third of the Court's five
ESA cases -

three out of four since Hill -

in which business interests

succeeded in getting their challenge to ESA administration before the Court.
Bennett thus drives home the pro-business bias thesis and establishes its
roots going back well before the Roberts Court era.

IV.

ENVIRONMENTAL

LAw DESIGN LESSONS

The final lesson to draw from the ESA's slow demise in the Court has
to do with how to avoid similar fates for other environmental laws, particularly in ecosystem protection and biodiversity conservation contexts where
new legislative initiatives may be needed to implement effective policy.2 03
Although I am not suggesting that avoiding harsh treatment in the Court
should be the driving factor in the design of such statutes, the ESA's history
shows why it is not a trivial concern. In this Part, therefore, I identify the
principal structural features that appear to be behind the statute's fall from
grace in the Court and suggest what lessons this fall offers environmental
law design. Whether legislators and agencies choose to follow them - and
I am not arguing one way or the other in that regard - is a different matter,
but they should at least be aware of the risks of not doing so.
A.

Avoid Directly Regulating Private Land and Resources

Although Bruce Babbitt's administrative reforms gave the ESA the look
and feel of an environmental regulatory program, no amount of makeup
could cover up the feature that most distinguishes the ESA from its pollution
control cousins - it directly regulates use of private land and resources.
The extreme version of political rhetoric about this quality of the ESA is the
claim that "today the ESA is a tool for controlling land and water, not for
202 See Patrick Parenteau, An EmpiricalAssessment of the Impact of CriticalHabitat Litigation on the Administration of the Endangered Species Act 5 (Vt. Law Sch. Faculty Papers,
Paper No. 1, 2005), available at http://Isr.nellco.org/vermontlaw fp/l (presenting an empirical
study of critical habitat litigation showing eighty-three percent of all active cases at the time of
the study were brought by business interest plaintiffs).
203 See generally J.B. Ruhl, Ecosystem Services and the Clean Water Act: Strategies for
Fitting New Science into Old Law, 40 ENvrL. L. 1381 (2010) (discussing the limits of administrative discretion to integrate the economics of ecosystem services into existing environmental
laws).
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preserving species." 204 More accurately, I would say, and have many times,
the agencies use the habitat modification prohibition embedded in harm definition as leverage to control land and water use as a tool for preserving
species. 205 Nor am I alone among legal scholars in recognizing the ESA as
one of the federal government's principal mechanisms for controlling use of
private land and natural resources. 206
Taking the ESA for what it is in this respect, the Court has not looked
favorably upon the ESA's impact on private land use. Consider that Hill and
Lujan involved only the scope of section 7 jeopardy prohibition restrictions
over federal projects, and yet that alone was concern enough for Justice
Powell, in his Hill dissent, to bemoan that the majority's decision would
mean "the Act covers every existing federal installation."207
By the time of Sweet Home, however, it was obvious that, through the
leverage the agencies' harm definition supplied over habitat modification,
the ESA was also about regulating private land and resource uses under sections 9 (take prohibition) and 10 (HCP permits) of the statute. This did not
go unnoticed by the Justices, as all of the examples in the majority and concurring opinions referred to private landowners, such as Justice Stevens's
reference to a "developer" who might "drain a pond" 208 and Justice
O'Connor's example of a "landowner who drains a pond on his property." 2 09
Even more directly, Justice Scalia in dissent focused intensely on his perception that the majority's reasoning employs the harm definition to "preserve[ ] habitat on private lands." 2 10
Bennett then returned to section 7 to connect it to private resource
users, in that case ranchers receiving irrigation water from federal reclamation projects. The ranchers' central claim was that under the FWS's biologi2" U.S. Congressman Mike Simpson, Bringing the EndangeredSpecies Act into the 21st
Century, http://simpson.house.gov/IssueStatements/ESAreform.htm (last visited May 18,
2012) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
205 See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, The Endangered Species Act and Private Property:A Matter of
Timing and Location, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 37 passim (1998); J.B. Ruhl, Biodiversity
Conservation and the Ever-Expanding Web of Federal Laws Regulating Nonfederal Lands:
Time for Something Completely Different?, 66 COLO. L. REV. 555, 579-601 (1995); J.B. Ruhl,
Regional Habitat ConservationPlanning Under the Endangered Species Act: Pushing the Legal and PracticalLimits of Species Protection, 44 SMU L. REV. 1393 passim (1991).
21 See Jacalyn R. Fleming, The Scope of FederalAuthority Under the EndangeredSpecies
Act: Implicationsfor Local Land Use Planning, 65 ALA. L. REV. 497 (2001) (discussing the
ESA as an example of "the federalization of land use controls"); Ashira P. Ostrow, Land Law
Federalism,61 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2012) (describing the ESA as among the "federal
permitting requirements significantly restrict[ing] the development of privately owned wetlands or species habitats"); William F. Pedersen, Using FederalEnvironmental Regulations To
Bargainfor PrivateLand Use Control, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 15-24 (2004) (discussing ways
in which the ESA imposes burdens on land use); Steven P. Quarles & Thomas R. Lundquist,
Land Use Activities and the Section 9 Take Prohibition, in LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 1, at 161 (describing the ESA's land use regulation provisions).
207 TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 203 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting).
208 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 701 n.15
(1995).
20 Id. at 713 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
'Id. at 714 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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cal opinion "the amount of available water will be reduced and that they will
be adversely affected thereby," 21 1 and that this harm was sufficient to allow
them standing under the ESA and the APA. Clearly, therefore, the scope of
control of private land and resource regulation has been pressing on the
Court's mind when evaluating the ESA.
The ESA's closest sibling among environmental laws, the wetlands protection program under section 404 of the CWA, has suffered a similar fate in
the Court largely as a consequence of its reach over private lands. Section
404(a) of the CWA authorizes the Secretary of the Army, through the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps"), to "issue permits ... for the discharge
of dredged or fill material in the navigable waters of the United States at
specified disposal sites."2 12 Thus, under section 404, and subject to specified
exceptions, wetlands subject to federal jurisdiction may be filled only if the
Corps grants a permit. These permits, known as "404 permits," "wetland
permits," or "Corps permits," have become the cornerstone for federal protection of wetland resources.213
Section 404 thus quite directly regulates private lands and resources,
putting pressure on the question of precisely where "navigable waters of the
United States" begin and end in the context of marshes, swamps, and other
not-so-obviously "navigable" waters. The Court has chipped away at that
question in a series of cases bearing an uncanny resemblance to the history
of the ESA cases. First, in a Hill-like opener the Court held that section 404
reaches wetlands that are adjacent to navigable waters, as the Corps' regulations provided, because "the Corps' ecological judgment about the relationship between waters and their adjacent wetlands provides an adequate basis
for a legal judgment that adjacent wetlands may be defined as waters under
the Act."21 4 Fifteen years later, however, the Court held that the Corps overreached in regulating "isolated ponds, some only seasonal, wholly located
within two Illinois counties ,"215 and most recently it ruled, in a fractured set
of opinions still befuddling courts and practitioners, that intermittent creeks
and channels would also in many, if not most, cases fall outside section 404
jurisdiction.216
Much like the ESA cases, therefore, the Court's three section 404 cases
begin with a decisive victory for environmental interests only to be followed

21" Bennett
212

v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 168 (1997).

33 U.S.C. § 1344(a), (d) (2006).

213 For background on the scope of federal wetlands regulation, see Douglas R. Williams
& Kim Diana Connolly, FederalWetlands Regulation: An Overview, in WETLANDs LAW AND
POLICY: UNDERSTANDLNG SECTION 404, at 1, 1-26 (Douglas R. Williams et al. eds., 2005).
214 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 134
(1985).
215 Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs (SWANCC),
531
U.S. 159, 171 (2001).
216 See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). The details and implications
of
Rapanos are far too complex to cover here. Suffice it to say entire symposia have been devoted to deciphering the Court's opinions. See, e.g., Symposium, Rapanos v. United States, 22
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'r, Summer 2007.
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by two equally decisive steps in the other direction.217 Perhaps most telling
as to what was behind this turnabout in the section 404 cases is the Court's
unsubtle warning, in its second foray into wetlands law, that extension of
federal jurisdiction to wetlands beyond the adjacent wetlands boundary risks
constitutional scrutiny because of its potential to "result in a significant impingement of the States' traditional and primary power over land and water
use."218

The lesson for environmental legislation from the Court's ESA and section 404 cases is clear: it is one thing for legislatures to regulate land uses
indirectly by constraining pollution and other land use externalities - that
will buy you the Court's default level of skepticism for environmental law
- but try directly regulating private land, water, and other resources and
you can expect the Court to employ a heightened level of scrutiny that resembles outright hostility. To be sure, it may be difficult to manage largescale ecological problems effectively without extending some form of regulatory impact over private lands and resources. Where that is the case, the
next two lessons offer some salient design considerations.
B.

Account for Regulatory Costs

Unlike many other environmental laws, the ESA is almost devoid of
attention to cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness standards for regulatory implementation. The jeopardy prohibition in section 7 anidthe take prohibition
in section 9 incorporate such checks on regulatory impact only indirectly
through exemption processes that extend little in the way of balance. The
"God Squad" exemption process in section 7, added in response to Hill, is
limited to instances where the benefits of the exemption "clearly outweigh"
217 Consistent with this trend, the Court recently unanimously held that an administrative
compliance order issued to residential property owners alleged to have illegally filled wetlands
on their lot without a section 404 permit was subject to pre-enforcement judicial review. See
Sackett v. EPA, 132 S.Ct. 1367 (2012). The Court rejected the government's position that the
order, which required the lot owners to restore the property or face fines up to $75,000 per day,
was not final agency action subject to review, leaving the owners the option of complying with
the order or violating it and contesting the claims in the agency's enforcement action. Id. at
1370, 1374. In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Alito described the government's position as "put[ting] the property rights of ordinary Americans entirely at the mercy of [agency]
employees" and asserted that "in a nation that values due process, not to mention private
property, such treatment is unthinkable." Id. at 1375 (Alito, J., concurring).
218 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174. Despite this warning, the Court has steadfastly declined to
review lower court decisions finding that ESA protection of purely intrastate species is not an
unconstitutional exercise of federal power over interstate commerce. See, e.g., Stewart & Jasper Orchards v. Salazar, 638 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 498 (2011);
Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coal. v. Kempthome, 477 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1097 (2008); GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2003),
cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1114 (2005); Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir.
2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1218 (2004); Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000),
cert. denied sub nom., Gibbs v. Norton, 531 U.S. 1145 (2001); Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v.
Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998). This persistent
refusal to engage the federal power issue is not unique to the ESA, but it does evidence a limit
to the Court's pro-business bias in environmental law contexts.
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the benefits of enforcing the jeopardy prohibition and are of "regional or
national significance" 21 9 and in any event this cumbersome and elaborate
procedure has rarely been employed. 220 The section 10 HCP program, while
offering a way for land owners to proceed with land uses by mitigating for
habitat modification, does not require that the permitting agency ensure its
demands meet any cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness condition other than
that the permit applicant be required to provide habitat loss mitigation "to
the maximum extent practicable." 22 1
Whereas the private land use component of the ESA grew over time as
a factor in the Court's jurisprudence, from the very start the Court has had a
problem with this lack of integrated, robust cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness mechanisms in the ESA's regulatory programs. Indeed, this concern
virtually defined Hill, as Justice Powell in dissent was relentless in claiming
that the majority's whatever-the-cost approach "requires the waste of at least
$53 million . . . and denies the people of the Tennessee Valley area the

benefits of the reservoir .... ."222 Even Chief Justice Burger, writing for the
majority, seemed puzzled that "the survival of a relatively small number of
three-inch fish . .. would require the halting of a virtually completed dam for
which Congress has expended more than $100 million." 22 3 As it has for so
many other aspects of this analysis, Bennett crystallizes the ESA's limited
attention to costs as a serious problem for the Court. It was problem enough
for Justice Scalia that the ESA's regulatory arms could potentially wreak
"economic dislocation" across the landscape, a trait the ESA shares with
many environmental laws even if properly administered. 224 The deeper sin,
however, was that if not checked by the best available science mandate the
ESA could result in "needless" economic dislocation meted out arbitrarily
by unintelligent, zealous agency officials. 225 In essence, Justice Scalia converted the "best available science" mandate into a second-best proxy for
cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness controls.
While the Court could not subvert a congressional mandate to protect a
particular environmental interest "whatever the cost," the ESA cases suggest that the Court can and will find ways to temper such unrealistic costinsensitive legislative exuberance through procedural maneuvers and crabbed interpretations of statutory provisions. Particularly when environmental
legislation substantially touches private lands and resources, therefore, incorporating more specific, rigorous attention to costs, such as through feasibility standards, than is found in the ESA could be a prudent strategy for
fending off this type of sideways judicial intervention.

219 16 U.S.C.
1536(h)(1)(A)(ii)-(iii) (2006).
220 See LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 1, at 60.
221 16 U.S.C.
1539(a)(2)(B)(ii).
222 TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 210 (1978) (Powell, J.,
223 Id. at 172.
224 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 176 (1997).
225 Id. at 176-77.

§
§

dissenting).
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The concern about the lack of such structure in the ESA no doubt
played an important role in motivating one of Secretary Babbitt's mid-1990s
administrative reforms - the "No Surprises" policy protecting HCP permittees from bearing the costs of responding to unforeseen circumstances
threatening a species covered in the permit. 226 This protection from runaway
costs was seen as a critical component of the reinvented HCP program to
allay landowner concerns,227 though the agency could only carry the thought
so far and even then was the target of intense pushback by environmental
interests. 228 Indeed, many ESA practitioners believe that more landowner
protections and incentives, rather than regulations, can produce an overall
more effective species conservation strategy and compliance culture. 229 The
history of the ESA in the Court thus suggests it would be prudent when
designing new or reformed environmental laws regulating private lands and
resources to pay close attention to such concerns and to build a coherent
regulatory framework for cost accounting and cost control into the legislation directly rather than relying on the initiative of post-enactment administrative reforms.
C.

Reduce Skewed Regulatory Burdens

As noble as the ESA's species conservation goals are, it has been difficult for the statute to shake the reputation of being unfair in its distribution
of benefits (primarily to environmental protection interests) and burdens
(primarily to private landowner interests). The reputation is not without
truth. As I have observed previously,
[t]he ESA's unfairness surfaces in many ways, usually concerning
the inherent unfairness possible whenever a landowner's fate depends on timing and location. For example, when land development is a major contributing cause of a species' endangerment,
those landowners lucky enough to have developed before the spe226 See 69 Fed. Reg. 71,723, 71,724 (Dec. 10, 2004) (codified at 50 C.R.F. §§ 17.22,
17.32(b)(5), 222.307(g)). The FWS has described the policy as within a package of reforms
"designed to: improve the species recovery rate while minimizing impacts of the ESA on
landowners, grant more authority to State and local governments, require greater scientific
scrutiny of endangered species decisions, and make implementation of the ESA more efficient." Making the ESA Work Better, ENDANGERED SPECIES BULL. (U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Serv.), May-June 1995, available at http://www.fws.gov/filedownloads/ftpDJCase/
endangered/bulletin/95/10points.html.
227 See Fred P. Bosselman, The Statutory and ConstitutionalMandate for a No Surprises
Policy, 24 ECOLOGY L. Q. 707, 711 (1997) (noting that reduced regulatory uncertainty increases land values).
228 See Spirit of the Sage Council v. Kempthorne, 511 F. Supp. 2d 31 (D.D.C. 2007)
(upholding the No Surprises regulation over a litany of substantive challenges over a decade
after the agencies first announced the policy). For a brief history of this litigation see Douglas
P. Wheeler & Ryan M. Rowberry, Habitat Conservation Plans and the EndangeredSpecies
Act, in LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 1, at 221, 225-27.
229 See, e.g., Michael J. Bean, Landowner Incentives and the Endangered Species Act, in
LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 1, at 207 passim.
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cies is listed, and whose land uses thus led to the listing, escape all
regulation. However, the poor souls that either intentionally or inadvertently left the species' habitat on their lands shoulder the
post-listing regulatory burden. Moreover, to the extent we justify
the ESA on the ground of the collective benefits species offer to
humans (medicines, aesthetic pleasure, ecosystem functions, etc.),
the costs of species protection tends to fall on a much narrower
subgroup of society than all those who derive the benefits.23 0 .
Once again it is Justice Scalia who places this issue in focus most aggressively, in his Sweet Home dissent, by expressing his concern that in extending the harm definition to reach private land regulation, the majority's
reasoning "imposes unfairness to the point of financial ruin - not just upon
the rich, but upon the simplest farmer who finds his land conscripted to
national zoological use."23 ' The unfairness in this, in his view, is that private
landowners bear the financial brunt of the nation's species preservation ideals. For Justice Scalia, the "cost of preserving the habitat of endangered
species" should be "place[d] upon the public at large, rather than upon
fortuitously accountable individual landowners." 23 2 Hence, the proper financing of species conservation in his view requires that "habitat destruction
on private lands . . . be remedied by public acquisition, and not by making

particular unlucky landowners incur 'excessive cost to themselves." 2 33 Justice Scalia reprises this concern as a central theme in Bennett, this time writing for a unanimous Court rather than in dissent, when he observes that the
ESA could be over-enforced against private interests.2 3 4
Indeed, the concern over the distributional effects of environmental
laws extends beyond the ESA and seems to be brewing in the Court with
respect to climate change regulation as well. In its first climate change decision, Massachusetts v. EPA,235 a majority of the Court found that the EPA
had erred in denying a citizen rulemaking petition to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions from motor vehicles under the CAA. The opinion opens with the
pronouncement that "[a] well-documented rise in global temperatures has
coincided with a significant increase in the concentration of carbon dioxide
in the atmosphere. Respected scientists believe the two trends are related."236 Just a few years later, however, the Court ruled that the EPA's
then-fledgling implementation of the CAA to regulate greenhouse gases preempted federal common law claims alleging that major sources of green-

230 J.B. Ruhl, The Endangered Species Act and Private Property: A Matter of Timing and
Location, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 37, 42 (1998).

231 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 714 (1995)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
232 Id. at 735-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
233 Id. at 728 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
234 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 166 (1997).
235 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
236

Id. at 504-05.
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house gases are public nuisances.231 Noting that EPA had decided that
greenhouse gases do contribute to climate change, the Court on this occasion
opened its decision with a reference to a well-known climate change skeptic
and the caveat that "the Court, we caution, endorses no particular view of
the complicated issues related to carbon-dioxide emissions and climate
change."23 8
It took the Court fifteen years before it started backpedaling on Hill and
the ESA, whereas for climate change it took a mere four. One explanation
for how swiftly the Court has retreated in the climate change context could
be a concern that nuisance liability would land arbitrarily on whomever
plaintiffs select as the guilty sources of greenhouse gas emissions. The
Court observed, for example, that EPA "is surely better equipped to do the
job than individual district judges issuing ad hoc, case-by-case injunctions.
Federal judges lack the scientific, economic, and technological resources an
agency can utilize in coping with issues of this order."239 And this has been
a theme of environmental law in general for many decades. Recall, for example, the famous case of Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.,240 in which New
York's highest court declined to enjoin a cement plant's air emissions found
to constitute a nuisance. The court in Boomer ruled instead that a damages
remedy, previously not available under New York law, was the more equitable approach.2 41 Among the reasons the court gave for its dramatic move
was that it would be unfair to impose on the defendant the burden of curing
what was an industry-wide pollution problem.2 42 As the court explained,
techniques to eliminate dust and other annoying by-products of
cement making are unlikely to be developed by any research the
defendant can undertake within any short period, but will depend
on the total resources of the cement industry nationwide and
throughout the world. The problem is universal wherever cement
is made.
For obvious reasons the rate of the research is beyond control of
the defendant. If at the end of 18 months the whole industry has
not found a technical solution a court would be hard put to close
down this one cement plant if due regard be given to equitable
principles.2 43
Of course, the faith courts demonstrate in expert environmental agencies to mete out costs and benefits in a more balanced, rational way than the
common law courts are capable of through nuisance law is unfounded in
contexts such as the ESA. This is because the ESA lacks rigorous attention
237
238
239

See Am. Elec. Power v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
Id. at 2533 n.2.
Id. at 2539-40.

240 257

N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).

Id. at 875.
242 Id. at 873.
243 Id.
241
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to costs to begin with and, other than what Bennett ekes out of the best
available science standard, has little in the way of checks on inequitable
agency cost distribution policy. It is as if the ESA was designed to concentrate the benefits of endangered species protection on those who bear little of
the costs, while concentrating the costs on those who enjoy few of the benefits. While it may be impractical, as well as constitutionally unnecessary, to
fulfill Justice Scalia's ideal of protecting private landowners from all regulatory constraints of ecological protection laws, the Court's ESA cases
strongly suggest that greatly skewed regulatory burdens are a red flag for the
Court and one of the indicia of environmental law that has led to the Court's
skepticism.
CONCLUSION

It is ironic that one of the best known and most revered of the Court's
environmental cases is essentially a dead letter in the Court's environmental
jurisprudence. Environmental law professors still teach Hill, and environmental lawyers still think of Hill when they think of the ESA, but the real
lessons lie in the Court's methodical evisceration of Hill in Lujan, Sweet
Home, Bennett, and Home Builders. The surgery, largely at the hands of

Justice Scalia, was so subtle and yet so complete that it seems to have taken
Justice Stevens by total surprise when Justice Alito stitched it up in Home
Builders.

The ESA's fall from grace thus provides a microcosm within which to
examine various theses environmental law scholars have offered about the
Court's environmental values and environmental law jurisprudence. More
than anything in this respect, the ESA cases suggest the Court holds a deep
skepticism of environmental law generally, particularly when business interests are on the line. The perfect storm for unleashing the Court's wrath,
moreover, brews when an environmental law directly regulates private lands
and resources, without mechanisms to ensure cost-benefit or cost-effective
regulation, and without attention to the potential for inequitable distribution
of costs and benefits. Those conditions define the ESA and have played a
prominent role in the Justices' opinions over the decades it took for Hill's
free fall to land with a thud in Home Builders. There may be no practical
way for environmental law always to avoid crossing these lines in ecosystem
protection and biodiversity conservation contexts, but the design lesson is
that when such a statute must venture into these dangerous realms, any
friendly reception in the Court is likely to be hard-earned and short-lived.
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